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Terrorist events in Britain in recent years indicate that some British Muslims do 
not view their lives through a domestic lens; that is, they do not embrace British norms 
and values.  Instead, they identify with a global Muslim community in a radical way.  
This thesis explains what is fueling the rise of pan-Islamism in Britain. 
For many Muslims, their religious identity is stronger than their British identity 
because they are alienated from the rest of society.  The alienation is generated by poor 
socioeconomic conditions; and discrimination, racism and Islamophobia.  The most 
important source of alienation, however, is the perception that British foreign policy in 
Muslim lands is leading to oppression and killing of their Muslim brothers and sisters.  
Alienation would not necessarily translate into mobilization and action was it not for 
radical leaders of the domestic Islamist community who were able to exploit protections 
provided by liberal British laws and traditions.  These men inspired the alienated to adopt 
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
On 7 July 2005 (7/7), the United Kingdom experienced its own September 11.  
Four radical Islamists, in coordinated suicide attacks, detonated bombs on three subway 
trains and a double-decker bus.  As the dust settled, more than 700 people were injured 
and fifty-six people, including the terrorists, were killed.  This event looked remarkably 
similar to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. except for one disturbing difference—the attackers 
were British citizens.  Three of the four terrorists were born in Britain of Pakistani 
descent and raised in working-class neighborhoods: Mohammad Sidique Khan (age 30), 
Hasib Mir Hussain (18), and Shehzad Tanweer (22).  The fourth bomber was Jamaican-
born Germaine Lindsay (20) who acquired his British citizenship at age one.    
This act was followed by another four attempted suicide bombings two weeks 
later on 21 July 2005 (7/21).  Essentially mirroring 7/7, the failed plan included three 
attacks on the subway system and an attack on a double-decker bus.  Fortunately for 
Londoners, this time all of the bomb detonation devices failed.  Two of the four alleged 
perpetrators were British citizens, and all four were British residents.  This terror cell was 
comprised of Muslim men of mixed ethnicity: Muktar Said Ibrahim (age 27, British 
citizen, Eritrean origin), Hussein Osman (27, British citizen, Ethiopian origin), Ramzi 
Mohamed (23, British resident, Somali origin), and Yasin Hassan Omar (24, British 
resident, Somali origin).1 
The July 2005 events were not the first time British Muslim citizens carried out or 
attempted to carry out a terrorist attack.  “On 30 April 2003, [Asif Mohammed Hanif and 
Omar Khan Sharif], two middle-class Britons of Pakistani heritage walked into a popular 
café near the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. … Once inside the café, [Hanif] detonated a 
bomb, killing himself and three bystanders and wounding dozens.  [Sharif] fled.  It was 
the first time that a citizen of Britain had committed an act of suicide terrorism in 
                                                 
1 Manfo Kwaku Asiedu is often considered a fifth member of the 7/21 terror cell.  He allegedly ditched 
a backpack with explosives on 21 July in a London Park.  For this, he was charged with conspiracy to 
murder and conspiring to cause an explosion.  Asiedu, age 32 at the time, is British resident of Ghanaian 
origin.   
2 
Israel.”2  Finally, like Hanif and Sharif, the infamous American Airlines Flight 63 “shoe 
bomber,” Richard Reid was born and raised in the United Kingdom.     
The thread that binds these stories is the fact that these men, while British citizens 
or residents, did not view their lives through a domestic lens; that is, they did not embrace 
British norms and values.  Instead, they identified with their oppressed Muslim brothers 
and sisters in Iraq, Afghanistan, the occupied Palestinian territories, and elsewhere.  
Identities are multiple and overlapping; however, there is a growing phenomenon of pan-
Islamic identification in British Muslim communities that far exceeds any form of British 
identification.3  Therefore, while the actions of these British Muslim men may seem 
irrational to the common Western observer, they are in fact rational reactions taken in the 
name of their cause and that they hope will weaken the British government.   
To varying degrees, Muslim integration, or lack thereof, is an increasingly serious 
problem for many Western countries, as evidenced by the 2002 “Lackawanna Six”4 
arrests in the U.S., the 2004 Theo van Gogh murder in the Netherlands, and the 2005 riots 
in the French banlieues (suburbs).  Furthermore, events in Europe directly impact the 
United States.  Peter Bergen, journalist, terrorism analyst, and fellow of the New America 
Foundation, explains: “One of the greatest terrorist threats to the U.S. emanates not from 
domestic sleeper cells or, as popularly imagined, from the graduates of Middle Eastern 
madrassah [traditional schools], but from some of the citizens of its closest ally, 
Britain.”5  Under our Visa Waiver Program, people like Mohammad Sidique Khan, 
Shehzad Tanweer, and Richard Reid—all of whom held a valid British passport—can 
board a plane for the U.S. without an interview by an American consular official.  
Because of this, Bergen points out that “future terrorist attacks damaging to the U.S. 
national security probably will have a strong European connection.”6  The August 2006 
                                                 
2 Peter Bergen, “They Will Strike Again,” Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2004. 
3 The idea of a pan-Islamic identity for British Muslims was first presented to me by Professor 
Zachary Shore. Zachary Shore (Naval Postgraduate School), interview by author, Monterey, California, 26 
October 2006.  See also Zachary Shore, Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).    
4 Six Yemeni-Americans convicted of providing material support to al-Qaeda.  The men were born 
American citizens, but of Yemeni descent.   
5 Peter Bergen, “Our Ally, Our Problem,” New York Times, 8 July 2005. 
6 Bergen, “They Will Strike Again.” 
3 
transatlantic airline terror plot, foiled by London police, was consistent with Bergen’s 
prediction. 
Determining why these attacks happened and how to prevent further attacks and 
loss of life is of critical importance.  This thesis will seek to answer the following 
question: What is fueling the increase of pan-Islamism in Britain that has sometimes led 
to violent extremism?  Uncovering the causes of this dilemma in Britain, by careful study 
of the British Muslim community, will help to determine a course of action most likely to 
stop terrorist attacks by British Islamists and will also shed light on the terrorist problem 
beyond the British Isles.    
B. WHY THE MUSLIM UNREST IN BRITAIN: EXPLANATIONS VARY 
There is a debate raging as to the reasons for the existence of radical Islam in 
Britain.  Different experts offer differing explanations.  Some experts blame the current 
problems on the failure of the British policy of multiculturalism.  Multiculturalism is a 
system where newcomers are admitted and allowed to “maintain cultural difference and 
form ethnic communities providing they adhere to the political rules.”7  Where there are 
too few efforts at assimilation or change, cultural differences between Muslims 
mainstream Britons have clashed, sometimes resulting in the outbreaks of violence 
Britain has recently experienced.  Other Western nations like Australia, Sweden, and 
others, have promoted multiculturalism without the domestic Islamic extremism that the 
British have had.  It is difficult to view the failure of multiculturalism as causal in the 
Muslim case when other minority communities who integrated under the same system did 
not attack their fellow countrymen.  East Asians, both Muslim and Hindu Indians, and 
Sikhs may not have integrated flawlessly, but they have not turned to extremism for the 
solution to their problems as some in the Muslim community have.       
Other experts point to British foreign policy.  The martyrdom videos of two of the 
four 7/7 bombers make it almost perfectly clear that British foreign policy in Muslim 
lands is at the heart of their discontent.  The political impotence they felt pushed them to 
one of the most extreme methods to try to influence national politics—suicide terrorism.  
Still, Prime Minster Tony Blair, in public statements, adamantly asserts that terrorists are 
                                                 
7 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 44.   
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not attacking Londoners because of opposition to policy in Iraq and elsewhere.  Instead 
he maintains that the terrorists simply hate the West’s way of life and want it destroyed.    
Another common argument is that injustice at home is fueling the pan-Islamist 
fires.  Studies indicate British Muslims experience racism in the workplace in the schools 
systems and in nearly every part of British life.  On average British Muslims are less 
educated, earning less, and living less favorable housing conditions than fellow citizens.  
Here again, though, other minorities face some of the same conditions and yet they are 
not reacting in the way that a minority of British Muslims are.  How could injustice at 
home then be the root cause of British Muslim militancy when other minorities facing 
similar circumstance are not reacting in the same way?  Why are the Muslim radicals 
different? 
Perhaps Britain is simply too liberal and this allowed the Islamism problem to 
develop—radical Muslims took advantage of British democratic principles such as 
freedom of religion and freedom of speech.  For instance, Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-
Masri was vehemently anti-West in public displays of pro-jihadi rhetoric, and for ten 
years he openly preached at the Finsbury Park mosque spreading these messages.8  
Several notorious Muslim radicals are known to have frequented Abu Hamza’s Finsbury 
Park mosque: Zacarias Moussaoui (the twentieth hijacker), Asif Mohammed Hanif, Omar 
Khan Sharif (mentioned earlier), and James Ujaama.9  Ujaama was a former Finsbury 
Park worshiper arrested in the U.S. in 2002 for trying to set up a terrorist training camp in 
Oregon.10  Why did it take authorities so long to arrest Abu Hamza and temporarily close 
down his mosque?  Could they not see that what Abu Hamza called freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion, was also a danger to society?   
Another question is how the Egyptian born imam of the Finsbury Park mosque 
wound up in Britain in the first place.  Some writers argue that Britain should never have 
                                                 
8 Jalal Ghazi, “‘Londonistan’ No More–‘Peace Pact’ Between Brits and Islamists Collapses,” Pacific 
News Service, 10 August 2005, 
http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=6d43269e19403587ab992abc428498d5 
(accessed December 2005). 
9 Irwin M. Stelzer, “Letter from Londonistan.”  The Weekly Standard, 1 August 2005, 24; and Ishara 
Bhasi, “Paying a Heavy Price,” India Today, 25 July 2005, 48.   
10 Daniella Peled, “Hooked on Abu Hamza,” The Jerusalem Report, 12 July 2004, 26. 
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allowed asylum seekers known to have links to radical organizations immigrate.  If 
immigrants became radicalized after they immigrated, why were they allowed to remain 
in Britain?  Once Abu Hamza was found to be a danger, critics say that Britain should 
have sent him back to his native Egypt or Yemen where he is wanted for crimes allegedly 
committed there.   
The argument is that pan-Islamism flourished because Britain was too liberal with 
its asylum and immigration laws and too strict with its deportation criteria.  Britain did 
not comply with extradition requests from Libya, France, Egypt, Yemen, and others.  For 
this stance London was sardonically renamed “Londonistan.”  Why did British authorities 
allow this state of affairs to develop?   No matter what the reasons, because of Britain’s 
acceptance or tolerance of known radicals, they were sitting on a ticking time bomb.   
It is evident that the spread of pan-Islamism was not the result of one or two 
problems.  The issue is complex and many-sided.  Some observers try to boil the problem 
down to a succinct conclusion.  For example, a July 2005 Congressional Research 
Service Report to Congress summed up the problem in this way:   
The failure of European governments to fully integrate Muslim communities into 
mainstream society leaves some European Muslims more vulnerable to extremist 
ideologies.  [Young Muslim men] feel disenfranchised in a society that does not 
fully accept them; they appear to turn to Islam as a badge of cultural identity, and 
are then radicalized by extremist Muslim clerics.11   
This is a good argument, but the foreign policy component is missing.  In a second 
example, Fawaz Gerges, Christian A. Johnson Chairholder in International Affairs and 
Middle East Studies at Sarah Lawrence College, provides another succinct explanation of 
the British problem, adding the foreign policy ingredient:   
Hideous as they were, the … London attacks must be understood within this 
ideologically fertile soil that attracts your uprooted men, some of whom are 
second-generation European Muslims, to militant causes; in their eyes, their 
imagined ummah is besieged and under threat.  Foreign policy grievances, 
coupled with social and cultural, as opposed to purely economic, marginalization 
supply the fuel that ignites terrorist activities worldwide.12   
                                                 
11 Kristin Archick, John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, Islamist Extremism in Europe (RS22211)—CRS 
Report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 29 July 2005), 3. 
12 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 242. 
6 
Gerges hits on the domestic alienation problem with social and cultural ills like 
discrimination and racism and well as the economic ingredient like high unemployment 
and lower standards of living, but he does not identify the catalyzing ingredient.  Who is 
or what is the mobilizing component who takes all this injustice and turns it into action?  
What is generally missing from the literature is how the components are linked together.  
What is needed is a step-by-step discussion of all the sources of alienation and how that 
alienation and anger is transformed into action like the 7/7 bombings.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to begin such a discussion.    
C. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW  
Britain sat at the eye of a storm.  The three components of the storm are visually 
depicted in the Venn diagram below. 
 
Figure 1.   Pan-Islamism in Britain: Causal Factors 
 
With the three components in mind, the answer to the question of what is fueling the rise 
of pan-Islamism in Britain follows:  
A minority, but sizeable number of British Muslims identify themselves first as 
Muslims before they are Britons.  Because they see themselves in this light, they are 
upset about British foreign policy in Muslim lands, which they think equates to the 
killing of thousands of innocent Muslims, including women and children, in Iraq, 
Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan.  They lack a British identity 
because they are not embracing the possibility of a dual identity as Muslim and British.  
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Even if they do accept that they have a dual identity, their Muslim identity is stronger.  
Their Muslim identity is stronger because they are alienated and not integrated or 
assimilated.  They are alienated and not integrated because they suffer from poor 
socioeconomic conditions: high unemployment, low paying jobs, high economic 
inactivity, and more.  They also perceive religious discrimination and racism in the U.K.  
This dissatisfaction would probably not translate into acts of terrorism, support for 
terrorism, and promotion of terrorism were it not for the radicals present in country.  
These radical Islamists operated under the protection of freedom of speech and religion.  
Radicals gave the alienated Muslims the tools to turn their frustration into action.  Some 
cases, however, do not fit this mold.  Some alienated and unhappy young men have been 
drawn to terrorism on their own, without the help of the radicals.  An affinity for the al-
Qaeda inspired global jihad ideology can occur via the internet, or from visits to foreign 
lands, or through friends or chance encounters that provide a new recruit with the same 
tools and solutions espoused by the radical leaders in the U.K.  While radical imams are 
only one of several ways that an alienated or disenfranchised young Muslim can be led 
into extremism, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, radical domestic Islamists were the 
primary catalysts for the outburst of terrorism in Britain.   
The hypothesis is defended in three chapters that lead up to the concluding 
chapter containing policy recommendations.  The next chapter describes domestic 
Islamism first by telling the stories of three of the most radical Islamist leaders in the 
U.K.  Then the broader problem with Islamism throughout the British Muslim 
community is considered.  A discussion follows about the laws and traditions in Britain 
that allowed radical jihadist ideologies to be promulgated in the British Muslim 
community.  The targets of the radicals, typically British Muslim men in their twenties, 
may not have been attracted to the ideologies espoused by British radicals had they not 
been alienated from British society.  Chapter three identifies six sources of this 
alienation.  It also offers reasons why a jihadist ideology is appealing to some British 
Muslims.  The strongest source of this alienation is British foreign policy.  While this 
topic is touched on the chapter three, it is more fully discussed in chapter four.  Finally, 
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II. DOMESTIC ISLAMISM 
A. INTRODUCTION OF ARGUMENT 
Radicals from abroad who have come to the U.K. legally and illegally, 
temporarily or long-term, have turned some alienated and disenfranchised youths into 
fellow radicals.  There are various locales where radicals mobilize, socialize, and speak to 
alienated youths searching for identity.  As mentioned in chapter one, the places can 
include not only mosques, but also less formal meeting places such as bookstores, 
gymnasiums, backrooms, garages, basements, prisons, and universities.13  At these 
gathering places, new recruits are engaged in discussion led by radical leaders, in an 
effort to “catalyze initial interest”14 in a new ideology and convert them to combative, 
radical Islamists.  Without radicals from abroad, the alienated and disenfranchised 
Muslims would not be as likely to take the step from mere alienation from British society 
to a combative, anti-West, pro-radical Islamist stance.   
Radicals proselytizing in the U.K. have been able to do so for three reasons.  First, 
liberal asylum and immigration laws have attracted Islamic radicals from abroad who 
take advantage of the openness of British society (as opposed to much more closed states 
characteristic of the Middle East, the Maghreb, and South Asia) to preach radical 
messages to alienated young Muslim men.  Once in Britain, deportation or extradition is 
difficult for a variety of reasons.  Second, because Britain is an open and free society, 
individuals and Islamic civic, political, and religious organizations and institutions are 
protected by strong democratic traditions of free speech and freedom of religion.  Third, 
British authorities were sometimes aware of what the radicals were doing, but chose not 
to arrest or otherwise infringe on their activities for reasons that seem controversial today.           
                                                 
13 Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office, Young Muslims and Extremism, April 2004, 2, 
12, 14, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/muslimext-uk.htm#ymae (accessed 
November 2006); Home Office, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 
(London: The Stationary Office, 11 May 2006), 15-17, 24; and Matthew Chebatoris (civilian terrorism 
analyst, Joint Analysis Center, U.S. European Command—Royal Air Force Molesworth, U.K.), interview 
by author, Monterey, California, 2 October 2006.   
14 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 5. 
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This chapter will first tell the stories of three radical Muslim leaders—how they 
arrived in the U.K. and what they have said and done while living in Britain.  Second, the 
widespread nature of the problem is discussed.  Third is a discussion of whether or not 
laws protecting freedom of speech and freedom of religion are too liberal in Britain and if 
changes to British immigration, asylum, deportation, and extradition laws are needed.  
Finally, why British authorities knew of Islamic extremism in their country, yet chose to 
look the other way, is examined.   
B. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 
1. Three Radical Leaders 
The three men profiled were chosen because they are extremists and have been 
linked to terrorists.  Furthermore, the story of each man demonstrates flaws or holes in 
the British approach to dealing with Islamic fanaticism.  For example, there were 
problems in the way British authorities dealt with the Muslim community’s need for 
spiritual leaders.  Imams from abroad were recruited by local mosque councils and 
immigration officials provided little quality control over the type of cleric that was 
entering the country.  Also, there are problems with immigration and asylum laws and 
procedures—laws are either not enforced or are too liberal to begin with.  Last, there are 
difficulties in deporting or extraditing individuals who are dangerous to the community.  
Since at least the year 2000, the British government has been trying to patch these holes.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, many radicals took advantage of the leniency of British 
policies.    
In the case of each of these men it now appears there were issues with British 
traditions of free speech and freedom of religion.  The incendiary rhetoric preached by 
these men was a threat to the public and yet it was not stopped until they had gone too 
far.  Politicians finally decided that there must be limits to what someone can say and do, 
even in a religious context.  The men in this study are Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri 
Mohammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri.   
11 
     
Figure 2.   Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri Mohammad, Abu Hamza al-Masri 
 
a. Abdullah al-Faisal 
Abdullah al-Faisal is of particular interest because of his link to 7/7 
bombers Germaine Lindsay and Mohammad Sidique Khan.  Britain’s Home Office in its 
official report of the London Bombings stated that Lindsay “was strongly influenced by 
the extremist preacher Abdullah al-Faisal (also of Jamaican origin). … Lindsay is 
believed to have attended at least one lecture and to have listened to tapes of other 
lectures by him.”15   
Mohammad Sidique Khan was known to have attended the al-Madina 
Masjid mosque in Beeston, England, where al-Faisal recruited and lectured.  An imam at 
the mosque, Hamid Ali, revealed to an undercover investigative reporter “that the leader 
of the London suicide bombers [Khan] had attended sermons in Yorkshire by al-Faisal.”  
Ali described “the [7/7] bombers as the ‘children’ of ‘Sheikh’ al-Faisal and part of his 
group of followers, the imam [Ali] disclosed that al-Faisal had visited the Beeston 
mosque at least three times to give ‘lectures’.”  Ali further explained that “Khan had 
many of his [al-Faisal’s] audio tapes.”  Ali said, “He had lots of them [tapes]. He 
definitely used to listen to al-Faisal tapes.  I borrowed some from him.”  Lastly, Ali 
“recalled Khan asking al-Faisal many questions during one of these lectures.”16 
Imam Abdullah al-Faisal’s radical message was summarized by Lord 
Justice of Appeal, Sir Mark Howard Potter, as he explained in general terms the 
wrongdoings of al-Faisal in the court appeal summary: 
                                                 
15 Home Office, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 18. 
16 “British Imam Praises London Tube Bombers,” The Sunday Times, 12 Feb 2006, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2036538,00.html (accessed December 2006).  
12 
At a number of public meetings, the appellant [al-Faisal] addressed 
audiences of predominantly young Muslim males about Islam and the way 
in which Muslims should conduct their lives. Some of these meetings were 
recorded on tape and the tapes were distributed to a number of specialist 
bookshops. … In his speeches, the appellant encouraged his listeners to 
kill.  He encouraged them to wage Jihad against the enemies of Islam as 
he deemed them to be. 17   
Waging jihad meant to kill kafirs (nonbelievers, infidels) and al-Faisal 
defined the kafirs as primarily Americans, Hindus, and Jews.  His audio tapes were 
distributed to fifteen Islamic bookstores in England for sale to the public.  The tapes that 
led to his conviction were titled “Jihad DAT,” “Jihad,” “Declaration of War,” “No Peace 
with the Jews,” and “Jewish Traits.”  The following are a few of his most threatening and 
incendiary comments from two of his audio tapes.  From “Jihad DAT:” 
The Jihad of a woman is to bring up her male children with a Jihad 
mentality.  Is that clear?  So when you buy toys for your boys you buy 
tanks and guns [laughter].  Helicopter gun ships and so forth.  This is the 
Jihad of a woman, to bring up her sons with a Jihad mentality not to be 
wimps but to be Mojahedeen.  And whenever you are a Muslim boy and 
you are 15 you are a solider automatically.  So all of you, sitting down in 
front of me are soldiers.  Is it sensible for you to be a solider and you don’t 
know how to shoot a Kalashnikov? A soldier who doesn’t know how to 
shoot therefore Jihad training is compulsory on all of you.18   
In a second tape titled “Jihad,” al-Faisal is similarly ruthless and brutal 
towards anyone other than people of the Muslim faith:   
You need to wage Jihad to repel the aggression of NATO, the UN, the 
USA, [and] the UK, only with Jihad we can repel the aggression so don’t 
entertain the idea of voting.  Our methodology is the bullet not the ballot. 
Is there any peace treaty between us and Hindus and Indian?  No, so you 
can go to India and if you see a Hindu walking down the road you are 
allowed to kill him and take his money, is that clear, because there is no 
peace treaty between us and him his wealth isn’t sacred nor his life 
because there is no peace treaty between us and him. 
Those who want to go to Jenna paradise it’s easy just kill a Kaffar 
unbeliever.  By killing that Kaffar unbeliever you have purchased your 
ticket to paradise. 
                                                 
17 Lord Justice Potter, Royal Courts of Justice: Appellate Review of Case No. 2003-01860-C2 
(London: Crown Prosecution Service, 4 March 2004), http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j2352/regina-v-el-faisal.htm (accessed December 2006). 
18 Ibid. 
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The sixth aim and objective of Jihad is to spread terrorism.  To terrorise 
the unbelievers.  If terror didn’t work Allah wouldn’t have commanded 
you to terrorise the unbelievers and the best way to terrorise them is to 
exterminate them with Jihad. 
Because of the evidence, including what he said on his tapes, he was 
convicted of (1) soliciting to murder, (2) using threatening, abusive, or insulting words or 
behavior with intent to stir up racial hatred, and (3) distributing threatening, abusive, or 
insulting recordings of sound with intent to stir up racial hatred.  His appeal was 
dismissed.19   
Al-Faisal “came into contact with other prominent extremists.  He is a 
close ally of the radical cleric Abu Hamza” (discussed below).  Al-Faisal is also “alleged 
to have been close to Earnest James Ujaama (described in introduction), who was jailed 
in America for two years after confessing his role in setting up an al-Qaeda training 
camp, allegedly with Abu Hamza, in Oregon.  Like [7/7 bomber] Khan, Ujaama asked 
questions at al-Faisal’s lectures in Britain.”20  Al-Faisal was the imam of the Brixton 
mosque in south London.  Both Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui attended the 
Brixton mosque21 and are “believed to attended [al-Faisal’s] lectures.”22  The link with 
these two men is not as direct as to 7/7 bombers Khan and Lindsey, but worth 
mentioning.   
How did such an extremist wind up in Britain?  This radical imam was 
born in Jamaica and left there at age 16 after converting to Islam.  Immediately after his 
conversion, he became a dedicated religious student.  He spent one year in Guyana, South 
America, and a full eight years of study in Saudi Arabia at the Imam Muhammad Ibn 
Saud University.23  After graduating in 1991, he went to Britain to help with the shortage 
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2036538,00.html (accessed December 2006). 
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of imams in country and soon thereafter, “he became the imam of the Brixton mosque” in 
south London.24  Imams from abroad are not an uncommon occurrence as British born 
imams are hard to come by.  To meet the spiritual needs of the community, imams from 
abroad are easily afforded visas to teach and preach in Britain.  This problem is explained 
further in section two below.     
b. Omar Bakri Muhammad 
Omar Bakri Muhammad was born in Syria in 1958 and is a Muslim cleric.  
His interest in Islamist organizations started at an early age.  At age 15 he joined the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.  In 1977, he fled Syria for Beirut and joined Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(HT), an organization which “is devoted to the establishment of an Islamic state (the 
caliphate) through a military coup.”  In 1979 he moved to Saudi Arabia and spent the 
early 1980’s recruiting activists for the Saudi branch of HT activists in spite of the fact 
that HT “was banned and [its] activism [was] severely repressed” by the Saudi monarchy.  
In 1983 Bakri Mohammad founded al-Muhajiroun (the Emigrants) as a cover 
organization for the illegal HT.  In 1985 Bakri Mohammad was deported from Saudi 
Arabia for his extremism and took refuge in Britain.  Upon arrival in the U.K., Bakri 
Mohammad formed the British branch of HT.  Bakri’s activism was extreme.  For this 
and other reasons, in late 1995 Bakri Mohammad was expelled from HT by the 
worldwide emir of the organization, Abdul Qadeem Zalloum.25   
Months later Bakri Mohammad re-launched al-Muhajiroun, this time in 
the U.K.  This new organization “adopted most of HT’s ideology” with some important 
differences.  Most noteworthy is the al-Muhajiroun aim that “Muslims in the United 
Kingdom must struggle to establish an Islamic state in Britain.”26  HT seeks only to 
reestablish the caliphate in “particular countries and areas of the world where success is 
most likely” and Britain does not fit this bill.  Bakri’s organization holds annual 
celebrations to honor the “magnificent martyrs” or the “magnificent 19” who carried out 
the 9/11 attacks.27  In a one-on-one interview with journalist Anthony McRoy, Bakri 
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http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/001652.html (accessed December 2006).   
25 Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 7-10, for all of the information in this paragraph.     
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Alan Cowell, “Britain: Taunts Follow Crackdown,” New York Times, 14 August 2005.   
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Mohammad clearly indicated his contempt for the non-Muslims and international laws of 
war.  Regarding the war in Iraq, Bakri Mohammad said “it is halal [lawful, permitted by 
shari’a law] to kill hostages in a war zone.”28  By hostages he means civilian hostages 
like contractors or journalists—he is not just considering captured soldiers.  There is a 
twisted hadith (quotations from the Prophet Muhammad) on his website that says the 
final hour will not come until Muslims conquer the White House.  He does qualify this 
statement by saying that this only will come realistically via Islamic missionary activity; 
however, his point is that there will be no end to jihad until Islam and Islamic law rule the 
world.29  A final quote by Bakri Mohammad clearly demonstrates his intolerance of non-
Muslims:  “We don’t make a distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents 
and non-innocents.  Only between Muslims and unbelievers.  And the life of an 
unbeliever has no value.  It has no sanctity.”30 
Scotland Yard has been investigating Bakri Mohammad since at least 
January 2005 suspecting that he has been inciting Muslim youth to join the insurgency in 
Iraq.31  Regarding the 7/7 attacks, like most radical Islamists, Bakri Mohammad blamed 
mainstream British Muslim and British voters for the bombings.  Voters are to blame 
because they returned Prime Minister Blair to power in the May 2005 elections.32  After 
the 7/7 terrorist attacks, Bakri Mohammad fled to Lebanon and was reported by Asharq 
Alawsat (a pan-Arab daily newspaper published in London) on 30 August 2005 to be 
hiding out in Beirut.33   
In the mid- to late-1990s, al-Muhajiroun’s powerful and hateful anti-West 
rhetoric brought it under suspicion of the British authorities.  One of the two British 
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suicide bombers who attacked a Tel Aviv café in 2003 had attended al-Muhajiroun 
meetings.  In the latter part of 2004, Bakri Mohammad issued a statement officially 
dissolving al-Muhajiroun to avoid being prosecuted under British incitement laws.34  
Prior to the disbandment, Bakri Mohammad claimed that al-Muhajiroun was the fastest 
growing group among Muslim youth.35  Authorities now say that al-Muhajiroun may 
have simply been renamed as Ahl us-Sunnah wal Jamaah or the Saved Sect.36  The Saved 
Sect’s website clearly shows how dangerous this organization may be to Western 
governments and their non-Muslim citizens.37   
c. Abu Hamza al-Masri 
Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri is equally anti-West.  For six years he 
led prayers and preached at the Finsbury Park mosque in London, spreading pro-Islam 
and anti-West messages.  He asserted that the 9/11 attacks were a Jewish plot and has 
repeatedly called for his followers to become martyrs on their own doorstep (meaning in 
Britain).38  He has publicly hailed Osama bin Laden as a liberator of the Middle East and 
regularly calls for a jihad against the West.39  Under Abu Hamza’s guide, the Finsbury 
Park mosque became a center of Islamic militancy.  Quintan Wiktorowicz, Assistant 
Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College, describes this militancy:  “The 
Finsbury Park mosque in London is a notorious center of support for radical Islamic 
groups aligned with al-Qaeda, including the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Algerian 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and the Algerian Armed Islamic 
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Group (GIA).”40  For this and other reasons, the mosque was raided by British authorities 
and subsequently closed down in January 2003.41   
Five terrorists mentioned earlier are former associates of Abu Hamza: 
Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid, Asif Mohammed Hanif, Omar Khan Sharif, and 
Earnest James Ujaama.42  In addition, four of the five 7/21 bombers were associated with 
the Finsbury Park mosque.  “Press releases from the Metropolitan Police and court 
services” say that Muktar Said Ibrahim and Yassin Hassan Omar “are believed to have 
attended” the mosque.  Manfo Kwaku Asiedu was actually living in the mosque in July 
2005.  After the Finsbury Park mosque was closed down in January 2003, Hussein 
Osman was part of a roughly 50 person gang who attempted a hostile takeover of the 
Stockwell mosque in south London as a new home for Abu Hamza (explained in greater 
detail in section two below).43 
Abu Hamza is different from the other two imams in that he was not 
drawn to the U.K. after he was radicalized, but was actually radicalized after immigrating 
to Britain.  For the first part of his life in Britain he was secular, westernized, and far 
from being a radical Islamic fundamentalist.44  Born in Egypt in 1958 as Mustafa Kamel 
Mustafa, he came to Britain in 1979 on a one-month visitor’s visa.  Abu Hamza’s goal 
was British citizenship and the prospect of a better life with more opportunity than he had 
in Egypt.  He said that in the early 1980s he was not a very good Muslim.  After an 
extramarital affair, it was then that Abu Hamza returned to Islam.  With God’s help he 
promised not to cheat on his wife again.  The marriage to his wife failed, but not his 
commitment to Islam.45   
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On a pilgrimage to Mecca he met Sheikh Abduallh Azzam, “founder of 
the Afghan Mujahideen”46 and soon to be mentor of not only Abu Hamza but also Osama 
bin Laden.  Next he changed his name to Abu Hamza al-Masri and over the course of 
several years traveled he traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bosnia to support 
Muslims.  As mentioned earlier, by the early 1990s Abu Hamza was “a leading figure in 
the British Islamist scene”47 and even founded his own political Islamist organization, the 
Supporter’s of the Shari’a.  Like al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir, his organization 
strove to re-establish the Caliphate, but also served as “the propagandists of the Algerian 
GIA (Groupe Islamique Arm) in Europe.”48  
By the late 1990s Abu Hamza was the leader of the Finsbury Park 
Mosque.49  A police raid on the mosque confirmed his radicalization.  Police discovered 
“several dozen forged and stolen passports, credit cards and driving licenses” as well as 
“chemical warfare suits, blank-firing pistols, knives, and handcuffs.”50  On 19 October 
2004, Abu Hamza was arrested in Britain and charged with 16 crimes, including: “using 
public meetings to incite his followers to kill non-Muslims” and “intent to stir up racial 
hatred.”51  British courts in February 2006 found him guilty of 11 charges including 
soliciting to murder and stirring up racial hatred.52   
These three men underscore problems with British laws and traditions: 
authorities did little screening of imams from abroad who filled much needed clerical 
leadership positions at local mosques, immigration and asylum laws were too liberal, and 
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strong traditions of freedom of religion and freedom of speech protected radicals.  The 
laws and traditions were changing rapidly in the early 2000s, which led to the arrest of 
Abdullah al-Faisal and Abu Hamza al-Masri and the flight of Omar Bakri Mohammad.  
This is not to say the problem has been solved.  The seeds of Islamic radicalism were 
sewn by leading men like these three, but they are not isolated individuals; they are part 
of a broader problem in the U.K.  
2. The Larger Problem Throughout the U.K. 
According to the latest census (2001), there are officially 1.6 million Muslims in 
the U.K.,53 but if “undocumented and asylum seeking Muslims” are added, the number 
may be as high as two million.54  For the purpose of this argument we will use two 
million.  How many of the two million Muslims are radical and a threat to society?   
The French domestic intelligence service, les Renseignements Généraux, has 
developed a formula for determining the number of Islamic radicals in their state.  They 
say that “five percent of [their] population would be considered “fundamentalists.”55  Of 
that five percent, “three percent could be considered dangerous.”56  Applying that 
formula to Britain there would be 100,000 fundamentalists and 3,000 of them would be 
considered dangerous.  The application of the French formula to the British population is 
problematical, but can serve as a rough guide.   
 It is instructive to look at the membership numbers of some of Britain’s known 
Islamist organizations.  After extensive research, Quintan Wiktorowicz claims that al-
Muhajiroun is “the most visible Islamic movement in the United Kingdom.”  In his book 
he says that in al-Muhajiroun there are 160 formal members, 700 “followers,” and 
approximately 7,000 “contacts.”  Followers are those who take “weekly religious 
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lessons” with the movement’s leaders and contacts are “potential participants who are 
considering participation in lessons and events.”57    
 The next logical Islamist group to investigate is Hizb ut-Tahrir.  Unfortunately, 
estimating membership in the U.K. branch of that international organization has proven 
difficult.  Wiktorowicz says that regarding formal membership, HT is probably larger, 
but admits formal numbers are not available.58  The British Broadcasting Company 
(BBC) in their report on HT, ran into the same uncertainty as to the number of members.  
While the leadership of the organization is acknowledged and vocal, the BBC could only 
say “membership is thought to be relatively small by political party standards, but 
certainly well organised, particularly among students who have been attracted to its 
ranks.”59  
Regarding other Islamist organizations, unclassified estimates of numbers of 
members are few and far between, especially since the enactment of Terrorism Act 2006 
which outlawed any organization that “glorifies terrorism.”  Since then, those involved in 
many movements have gone underground to avoid arousing suspicion from the 
authorities.   
One way to consider how many radical leaders are out there would be to 
determine how many imams there are in Britain.  Estimates place the number of mosques 
at 1,60060 and the number of imams at 2,000.61  There are no estimates on the number of 
“radical” imams, but perhaps there are lessons to be learned from looking at the imams 
on the whole.  The first factor to consider is that most imams are trained abroad because 
the significant number of Muslims in Britain is a relatively new phenomenon (post-
WWII) and the most respected schools for imam training are in the Middle East and 
South Asia.  In the past, immigration officials did not deny visa applications very often 
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because of the shortage of Muslim religious leaders.  “So long as [the] mosque council” 
could guarantee “that it would provide an income for the imam, … work permits [were] 
not generally … a problem.”62  Because of these reasons, less than 10 percent of imams 
received their religious training in the U.K.63     
Why is training from abroad a problem?  There are at least two reasons.  The first 
reason was reported by a “leader of a mosque association representing one-third of 
Britain’s mosques.”  He “reported that 80 percent of his association’s imams were ill-
prepared to cope with the demands made upon them by the members of the mosque 
communities and by local governments and other civic groups.”64  What does ill-prepared 
mean?  Because imams came from abroad, “they have no real knowledge of the societies 
in which their followers live” and may not even speak English.65  Imams unfamiliar with 
the British society that they are living in are of little help the youth in their congregation 
facing identity or alienation issues.  Therefore, “many European Muslims reject these 
clerics.”66  Because the youth have rejected the traditional imams, radical clerics like 
Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri Mohammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri are able to take 
advantage of the situation “to advocate a radical Islam and to attack western values, or 
European and U.S. policy which they denounce as anti-Muslim or pro-Zionist.”67   
 British government reports reveal some relevant statistics as to how many Islamist 
radicals exist in the U.K.  One report estimated 10-15,000 British Muslims are supporters 
of al Qaeda or related groups68 and another said that 10,000 people attended a single 
Hizb ut-Tahrir conference in Britain in 2004.69  Looking deeper, for those who are more 
than just conference “attendees” or “supporters,” government reports claim there are 
many Muslims in Britain estimated to have had some form of terrorist training.  For 
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instance, in January 2002, British Intelligence discovered, in the mountains of Tora Bora 
Afghanistan, “the names of 1,200 British citizens, all Muslim, who trained with the Al-
Qaeda network in Afghanistan.”70  Updated information was provided by former 
Metropolitan police chief, Lord Stevens, when in July 2005 he revealed that “up to 3,000 
British-born or British-based people had passed through Osama bin Laden’s training 
camps.”71  Of those Britons who have trained with al-Qaeda, many have had actual battle 
experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, or Chechnya.72  Considering Lord Stevens’ 
statement, it appears the les Renseignements Généraux formula (described above) could 
be applied to the British state as well.       
 These facts can be updated with what the MI5’s Director-General Eliza 
Manningham-Buller, said in her “Terrorist Threat to the U.K.” speech on 9 November 
2006.  She revealed that her organization is “working to contend with some 200 
groupings or networks, totaling over 1,600 identified individuals (and there will be many 
we don’t know) who are actively engaging in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here 
and overseas.”  The Director-General went on to reference British opinion polls 
conducted since July 2005 which pointed out statistically speaking that “over 100,000 of 
our citizens consider that the July 2005 attacks in London were justified.”  Again, this 
seems to validate the French formula if you would categorize someone as a 
“fundamentalist” if they believe the killing of 52 civilians was justified.  Furthermore, 
Manningham-Buller is aware of thirty “plots to kill people and to damage our 
economy.”73  
In summary, it is clear that there is a larger problem in the U.K. than just a few 
radical imams preaching hate.  Chapter three of this thesis explains that British Muslims 
have reason to feel disenfranchised and alienated because of a multitude of reasons.  
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Evidence provided above indicates that a significant number of those disenfranchised 
could be categorized as a risk to society.  The importance of the existence of radical 
leaders in British society cannot be understated because the disenfranchised need 
someone to lead them.  Because of liberal asylum and immigration laws, plus strict 
extradition and deportation laws, combined with liberal laws protecting free speech and 
freedom of religion, the disenfranchised have plenty of radical leaders to choose from.   
A compelling question to ask is: where are all the moderate Muslim leaders?  The 
focus of the paper thus far is on those who are radicalizing young Muslim men and how 
are they able to do so, but if moderates were better able to dilute the message of the 
extremists, then perhaps the state would not be in such a predicament.   
Gilles Kepel, Professor and Chair of Middle East Studies at the Institute of 
Political Studies in Paris, has studied this question in some depth.  He explains that there 
are three warring parties fighting for the hearts and minds of young Muslims and for the 
future of Islam in Europe.  Two of the groups are separatists who do not want to integrate 
their culture with a European culture and the third group is integrationist in nature.  On 
the separatist side are the adherents of jihad and the “sheikists.”74  Both the sheikists and 
the integrationists represent moderate European Muslims.   
The ideology of both the separatist groups is based on Salafism.75  The jihadists 
like Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri Mohammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri believe in a 
violent, vocal, and active struggle to reconcile the differences between the West and 
Islam.  The sheikists, however, are known as the pietistic or quiet Salafists because their 
approach to the same question is non-violent, inward looking, isolative, and reflective.  
They “preach self-imposed apartheid or advise believes to isolate themselves in a mental 
ghetto to avoid contamination by European infidels.”76  Their approach is less 
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newsworthy because their actions are not sensational.  One reason their passive approach 
is not resonating with some youth was alluded to above in the discussion of imam 
recruitment—the sheikist imams recruited sometimes are out of touch with the societal 
troubles facing a young Muslim alienated in a country he calls home and therefore the 
youth reject these clerics’ perspectives and advice.   
A second reason for the radicals’ appeal is the flashy imagery presented in their 
advertising campaigns.  Enthusiasm, adventure, and flashiness are missing from the quiet 
salafists’ advertising campaign.  That is not to say the advertising campaign from the 
quiet Salafists does not appeal to some, but for many spirited young Muslim men, the 
glory, nostalgia, and romanticism attached by the radicals to the jihad lore of wars past 
has much more appeal.  The jihadists tell young men that they can be just like their 
Muslim heroes from the wars of yesteryear if they too fight in the name of Islam.  They 
sell a convincing argument that martyrdom brings glory in the afterlife.  A young man 
can have all this glory if he is willing to give his life to the greater good of Islam.   
The third Islamic faction in Europe fighting for young European Muslims’ hearts 
and minds are the integrationists.  Some of the integrationists walk in the footsteps of the 
Muslim Brotherhood like the U.K. based Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe 
(FIOE).77  Others include the Muslim Council of Britain, the Muslim Association of 
Britain, and the Islamic Society of Britain (to name a few).  The integrationists seek “to 
collaborate with institutions and nongovernmental organizations.  They advocate a 
gradual widening of Islamic influence in European cities through full participation in 
political, social, and cultural life.”78  In short, they seek to assimilate, but with their own 
distinct Muslim seat at the political discussion table.  The idea here is to participate fully 
in British society and politics, but to participate fully as Muslims, “blending innate Arab 
or Muslim traits with acquired European ones.”79  This will eventually give Muslims a 
vote in forming British domestic and international policy.  Note, however, that 
maintaining Muslim identity is central for the integrationists.  They are not secularists 
and obviously reject the separatist notions of the adherents of jihad and the quiet 
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Salafists.  In the competition for the hearts and minds of young Muslims they run into 
some of the same problems as the quiet Salafists.        
A third reason why the radical message is so successful is intimidation, a problem 
for both the quiet Salafists and the integrationists.  The following story is just one 
example of the intimidation factor.  The general opinion of the Stockwell mosque was 
that it was a moderate place of worship.  In 2003 a group of 50 extremists, hailing from 
the Finsbury Park mosque, “attempted to wrest control of the Stockwell mosque in south 
London.”  They did this because they were “searching for a spiritual home for the radical 
cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri following the [police] raid upon [his] mosque and its 
subsequent closure” earlier that year.  The group intimidated the imam, wrote “a letter 
demanding the imam’s suspension,” and intimidated worshipers.80  Paul Tumelty, a 
terrorism analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, comments further: 
For a period, members of the group turned up to the Stockwell mosque on 
a daily basis, calling unsanctioned meetings and intimidating the faithful.  
On a number of occasions they attacked the mosque’s worshipers, 
attempted to break-in, and sprayed graffiti on its walls.81      
In sum, it is not there are not moderate Muslim leaders in the U.K.  In any debate 
there are winners and losers, and for reasons described about, the moderates lost out in 
the battle for the hearts and minds of men like the 7/7 bombers.   
3. Results of Lenient Laws 
The fact that, in the not so distant past, men like Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri 
Muhammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri were able to seek asylum, get away with 
espousing their radical messages, avoid arrest for so long, and avoid extradition suggests 
that there may be unwanted loopholes in British traditions and laws.  The problem that 
the Britons are faced with is the need to protect themselves against domestic enemies 
while upholding principles they hold dear to their hearts:  humanitarian principles like 
multicultural tolerance and protection from religious persecution, and civil rights 
principles like freedom of speech and the right to privacy.82  How tolerant should a 
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nation be in terms of who qualifies for political asylum and what radicals claim is a right 
to freedom of speech and freedom of religion?   
First, it is necessary to understand British traditions and their mindset towards 
international terrorism.  Because the 9/11 attacks did not occur on British soil, there was 
a common misconception held by British citizens that they were not really at risk.  Britain 
looked at the war against terrorism more as a game of criminals and cops and not as a 
war.83  A failure to see any threat to Britain combined with traditional British beliefs that 
emphasize the importance of freedom of speech and multicultural tolerance make it 
understandable how Bakri Mohammad and Abu Hamza had the liberty to preach jihad 
without reproach.84  Additionally, the tradition of asylum for the persecuted is ingrained 
in British values.   
Britain’s “asylum laws were designed to protect … dissidents and refugees from 
foreign governments.”85  This is a long-standing tradition.  For example, both Karl Marx 
and Vladimir Lenin sought and were provided refuge in the U.K. after fleeing their 
homelands.  In modern times, the result of this tradition “is that, for the Middle Eastern 
refugee population, a proportion of them can claim asylum specifically on the basis of 
their Islamist political opinion and activity.”86  As of 2001, approximately “2,000 Middle 
East dissidents a year poured into Britain.”87  Some of these men were radical Arab 
Islamists who rigorously preached defiant messages openly and this was a contributing 
factor to the birth of local Islamist terror cells anxious to target at home.88     
Once in Britain, radicals are home free because authorities, shackled by their own 
laws, are caught in a catch-22.  Because Britain is a party to the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the British government cannot extradite or 
otherwise force individuals to their home country or a third other country, if in the 
country in question the said individual could face torture or inhumane or degrading 
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treatment or punishment (article 3) or the death penalty (article 3 and protocol 6).  This 
law applies not only to Middle Eastern or third world countries, but also to the U.S. and 
France.  As a result, the British government must work individual bilateral agreements 
between other governments before extradition can occur.  Prior to 7/7 this was almost an 
impossibility as the British government, or more accurately the British courts, typically 
sided with human rights activists who rejected the idea of deportation on the grounds that 
foreign governments could not be trusted to refrain from subjecting these prisoners to 
inhumane treatment.     
In a free society there will always be a difficult balancing act between protecting 
the public from someone willing to say something that might harm them and protecting 
civil liberties like freedom of speech.  These conflicting forces are clearly illustrated by 
the fact that just 30 days after the 7/7 bombings, Britain let the Qatari Muslim cleric 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi into the country to speak at a conference.  Al-Qaradawi has defended 
suicide bombings, justified the killing of Israeli women, backed the execution of 
homosexuals, called for the killing of Jews, and said that wife-beating with the hand is 
acceptable.  In contrast to Britain, the Americans barred al-Qaradawi from entry to the 
U.S.89  In the British case, part of the problem was that fact that “the British legal system 
[was not] equipped to deal with British citizens whose only offense was the support of 
violence in other countries.”90  This problem was remedied with the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, which now makes it illegal for someone to promote armed struggle 
not only domestically, but also abroad.  Prior to this law, radicals like Abu Hamza were 
doing their worst because they could get away with it.   
There have been laws on the books in Britain to address terrorism from at least 
1974, but the Terrorism Act of 2000 is a starting point for modern terrorist legislation.  
“The Act came into force in response to the changing threat from international terrorism, 
and replaced the previous temporary anti-terrorism legislation that dealt primarily with 
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Northern Ireland.”91  Under the Terrorism Act of 2000, via the Secretary of State, an 
organization is defined as a terrorist organization if it “commits or participates in acts of 
terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise 
concerned in terrorism either in the UK or abroad.”92  Britain’s Home Office maintains 
the state’s official list of terrorist organizations as named by the Secretary of State.  As of 
November 2006 there are 44 international organizations and 14 organizations from 
Northern Ireland on the list.93   
After 9/11, the British parliament passed an emergency piece of legislation, The 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (ATCSA) of 2001.  This law allowed the 
detention of non-British citizens suspected to be a risk to national security.  It permitted 
detaining individuals where there was insufficient evidence to prosecute them.  The 
length of detention is not defined and therefore could hypothetically lead to an indefinite 
detention without the right to a fair trial.  Britain could not easily deport these threatening 
non-British citizens because Britain is a signatory to the 1950 ECHR.  Laws enacted after 
that agreement do not allow the British government to deport or extradite a person to a 
country known to torture or inhumanely treat prisoners and this includes countries that 
permit capital punishment.  When British officials cannot deport a suspected terrorist and 
they cannot charge him with a crime, ATCSA allows the government to put a suspect in 
prison until he is no longer a threat or a third “humane” country will take the prisoner.  
British courts had a serious problem with the fact that ATCSA ran contrary to both the 
ECHR and updated, British specific, human rights legislation—the U.K.’s Human Rights 
Act of 1998.94   
To remedy the problem between the courts and the Parliament, ATCSA was 
replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 just four months prior to London’s 7/7                                                  
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bombings.  This act adjusted two things.  First, it replaced indefinite prison detention 
with “control orders” which could mean house arrest, limitations on the use of the 
internet or cell phones, electronic tagging, and more.  Also, the act now permitted 
detention of both British citizens and non-British citizens who are suspected to be 
terrorists.  This detention is limited to 28 days.  After that the individual must be charged 
with a crime, placed on control orders, or freed.95  
With the attacks of 7/7 the ante was again raised and as of 22 August 2005, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair planned to prevent further attacks by strengthening legislation to 
combat terrorism.  His new 12-point plan piggybacked on the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 and could curtail more civil liberties and freedom of speech.  Part of the plan 
includes “banning radical groups, extending pretrial detention, and listing extremist 
centers and bookshops that will trigger deportation of any foreigner ‘actively engaged’ 
with them.”96   
Many in the British Muslim community feel “Blair’s 12-point plan is like cork in 
a volcano that intensifies the us [Muslims] vs. them [British government] feeling.”97  Of 
course not only the Muslim community, but also British civil libertarians are appalled by 
Blair’s 12-point plan.98  Few argue that the terrorist threat is not real, but even many 
Lords of the British courts side with the civil libertarians.  They argue that “arbitrary and 
oppressive action on the part of government” is available under the new anti-terrorism 
laws and this increases “the risk of a miscarriage of justice.”99 
The outcome of the debate was the Terrorism Act 2006.  This act makes “it more 
difficult for extremists to … encourage others to commit terrorist acts,” whilst hiding 
under the guise of freedom of speech or freedom of religion.  The act makes it illegal to 
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plan acts of terror, encourage or glorify terrorism, disseminate terrorist publications, and 
to be in attendance at a place of terrorist training. 100  Opposition leaders still voice the 
same concerns as were raised over Blair’s 12-point plan.   
4. British Toleration of Terrorist Groups 
The problem of weak anti-terrorism laws was only part of the problem.  There is 
also evidence indicating that British authorities knew what many radicals were up to, but 
chose to look the other way for political, strategic, and other reasons.  Three case studies 
of the British government’s interaction with France, Egypt, and Libya, with regards to 
Islamist terrorists, shed light on the following questions: Did British authorities know 
there was a hotbed of radical Islamist activity in their country?  Did British authorities 
knowingly harbor radical Islamists?  If the answer to those two questions is “yes,” then 
why?   
In the mid- to late-1990s several countries complained about “Londonistan.”  
Among others, France and Egypt complained that Islamic terrorists, hostile to their state, 
were taking refuge in the U.K.  “France charged that the Algerian Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) used London as an operational base from which to carry out bombings in Paris in 
the mid-1990s.  Cairo has long argued that British complacency allowed members of the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad to operate on its territory with impunity.”101   
The French complaints were base on investigations that uncovered that Rachid 
Ramda was the financier of the 1995 Paris metro attacks.  He was arrested in 1995 by 
British police, at French request, but his extradition request was denied for ten years—
obviously upsetting the French.102  French complaints were not limited to simply the 
Paris metro bombings.  In a second example, Algerian Lamine Maroni, the man behind 
the failed 2000 Strasbourg cathedral bombing plot, “lived off of [British] state benefits 
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and was housed by a Home Office-sponsored agency,” while he planned his attacks.103  
The list of complaints seemed never-ending and led the French to dub the city of London 
“l’antechambre de l’Afghanistan,”104 meaning it was a microcosm of Afghanistan.  
      In Egypt, besides the Egyptian complaint that Britain harbored members of 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Cairo was particularly upset when Abu Hamza publicly 
announced his approval of the October 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt that left 58 
European tourists dead.  This led to a formal denunciation of British policies regarding 
asylum seekers—Cairo defined Britain as “a hotbed for radicals.”105 
Going further, Egypt pointed out that “of its 14 most wanted terrorists, seven … 
were based in Britain.”  The poster child of for the notorious 14 was Yasser al-Sirri who 
was “sentenced to death in absentia [by Egyptian courts] for plotting the failed 
assassination of … Egyptian prime minister [Atef Sidqi in 1993], and still running—with 
British permission—the Islamic Observation Centre in London, a mouthpiece for 
Egyptian rebels” (as of 2001).106    
The brief overview of the French and Egyptian cases definitely shows a trend that 
the British government was accommodating and tolerant of Islamic radicals, especially 
prior to 9/11.  Even more surprising to many was the fact that even Libya complained 
that Britain knowingly harbored terrorists. Matt Chebatoris, civilian terrorism analyst, 
Joint Analysis Center, U.S. European Command—Royal Air Force Molesworth, United 
Kingdom, pointed out that there was a tendency of the British authorities to look the other 
way when it came to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, such as the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group107 (LIFG), who were allowed to operate in Britain as long as they 
were not conducting attacks against or in the UK.108   
LIFG is an organization of Islamist radicals that seeks regime change in Libya.  
Repression by Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime led to LIFG dispersal around the globe.  
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Some landed in the U.K.  Britain granted asylum on the basis of what was mentioned 
above—the tradition of granting asylum to political dissidents who would be persecuted 
in their home countries.  LIFG men indeed fit that bill.  LIFG activists living in Britain 
always focused their militant actions abroad, not domestically, and this may be one 
reason why authorities looked away from any suspicious virulent activity perpetrated by 
the group.  Such activities included anti-Libyan regime propaganda, financing, and 
terrorist planning, as well as alliance with other terrorist organization like al-Qaeda or the 
GIA.   
A second reason authorities did not crackdown on LIFG members in Britain 
relates to an idea mentioned earlier—there were no laws on the books to prosecute those 
who were promoting armed struggle abroad.  A third and most intriguing possibility 
relates to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland.  That event put 
Qaddafi and his regime on unfriendly terms with Downing Street.  Therefore it is 
possible that the British government did nothing to curtail the activities of LIFG members 
simply because of the animosity they felt for Qaddafi’s regime.  There is some support 
for this supposition.  Ex-MI5 officer David Shayler claims that British intelligence helped 
to finance LIFG’s failed assassination attempt on Qaddafi in 1996.  That allegation has 
not been proven, but it certainly seems plausible.109   The French, Egyptian, and Libyan 
stories demonstrate that the British authorities knew their country was a hotbed for 
Islamic activity, and they also knew that they were harboring radical Islamists.   
There are at least four possible explanations for the British response to Islamists 
in their country.  First, there was no reason to crack down on the Islamists because they 
were not a threat to Britons.  “By the mid-1990s the UK’s intelligence agencies and the 
police were well aware that London was increasingly being used as a base by individuals 
involved in promoting, funding and planning terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere.  
However, these individuals were not viewed as a threat to the UK’s national security, and 
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so they were left to continue their activities with relative impunity.”110  In essence, the 
authorities at the time only had a narrow focus, “national security.”  The GIA, the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the LIFG were someone else’s problem. 
A second explanation is that existing laws did not allow authorities to arrest 
anyone who was preparing, promoting, or encouraging terrorism abroad.  It was not until 
the Terrorism Act of 2000 that arrests could be made for other than for domestic offenses 
in those areas.  Extradition laws similarly tied British hands.  For example, even if British 
authorities arrested the seven alleged terrorists wanted by the Egyptian government, 
British laws forbade deportation or extradition of these men to Egypt based on Egypt’s 
history of human rights abuses against political prisoners.  
The third explanation is that an unlikely “deal” existed between the Islamists and 
British authorities.  Some postulate that there was an agreement whereby Islamists would 
not be harassed by the police or other authorities so long as the targets were outside 
Britain.  No British official will verify this unlikely deal, but Omar Bakri Muhammad 
described such a deal in an interview with a London Arabic newspaper, Asharq Alawsat, 
on 22 August 1998.  When asked why Islamic groups have never attacked Britain he 
responded, “I work here in accordance with the covenant of peace which I made with the 
British government when I got [political] asylum. … We respect the terms of this bond as 
Allah orders us to do.”111 
The fourth explanation was mentioned above in the LIFG discussion: the enemy 
of my enemy is my friend.  If LIFG members based in the U.K. were harassing a regime 
unfriendly to the British government, why should the British have given these men up to 
the Qaddafi regime?   
This section provided some explanations as to why Britain became a hotbed of 
Islamist activity and why the authorities responded to this activity in the manner that they 
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did.  The four possible explanations are not the only ones, but provide a basis for 
understanding what is fueling pan-Islamism in Britain.      
C. CONCLUSION 
The British system of laws and practices were designed to protect values that all 
members of a free society hold dear to the heart: asylum for the persecuted, freedom of 
religion and speech, protection from human rights abuses and other civil liberties.  It is 
clear that radical Islamists were able to take advantage of loopholes in the British system 
and radicalize some Muslim youths.  However, domestic Islamism alone is not enough to 
cajole well integrated young Muslims.  Young men were receptive to radical messages 
because they were alienated from their British community.  The sources of this alienation 
are described next.   
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III. SOURCES OF ALIENATION 
A. INTRODUCTION OF THE ARGUMENT 
This chapter argues that many young Muslims are alienated from British society, 
and that this alienation makes youth vulnerable to extremist preachers and causes them to 
identify with pan-Islamism, rather than with a British identity.  This in turn makes them 
more receptive to extremist influences.  This chapter will focus on domestic issues, 
leaving issues related to British foreign policy to chapter four.  
Researchers, academics, surveys, polls, government reports, nongovernmental 
reports, and interviews with civic and political Muslim and non-Muslim leaders have 
demonstrated that there are a sizeable number of alienated young Muslims in Britain.  
The sources of alienation can be broken down into six socio-economic discussion areas: 
politics; unemployment and economic inactivity; standard of living; the perception of 
religious discrimination, racism, and Islamophobia; education; and the police, the courts, 
and anti-terrorism legislation.    
 The chapter has three parts.  First, there is a discussion of Britain’s immigration 
policy of multiculturalism, a comparison to other nations, and a discussion of why Britain 
chose multiculturalism and what the results have been.    Next, there is a brief overview 
of the statistics regarding the Muslim community in Britain.  Last, there is a detailed 
discussion of the six socio-economic sources of alienation mentioned above. 
B. THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS: IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
REVIEWED  
In the past twenty years or so there have been three types of immigration policies 
common to North America, Western Europe, and Australia, as described by Stephen 
Castles and Mark Miller in their book The Age of Migration.112 These policies are 
differential exclusion, assimilationism, and multiculturalism.113   
As used in the following discussion, the term “integration” means “the bringing of 
people of different racial or ethnic groups into unrestricted and equal association, as in                                                  
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society or an organization; desegregation.”114  Segregation inhibits integration both 
formally and informally.  For instance, segregation can be state sanctioned as in the 
formal apartheid laws of South Africa prior to 1990 or it can be socially enforced or de 
facto as in the separation of blacks and whites in the southern United States in the early 
twentieth century.  The term “assimilation” means “the process whereby a minority group 
gradually adopts the customs and attitudes of the prevailing culture.”115  Sociologist 
Milton M. Gordon describes it as a seven-stage process, starting with the adoption of “the 
language, dress, and other daily customs of the host society,” moving on to the “large-
scale entrance of minorities into the cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society,” 
and finally resulting in things like “frequent intermarriage” and the disappearance of 
prejudice, discrimination, and civic conflicts.116   
The two terms describe stages in a process.  First, a person is integrated into the 
society—no longer  separate from the rest of society—and then a person is assimilated—
fully a part of the society, both legally (a citizen with full rights under the law) and 
socially.  They are truly accepted as equals by all. 
The first policy, policy of differential exclusion, means that the state never intends 
for the migrants to immigrate permanently, i.e., the migrants are simply guest workers.  
This policy was adopted by Germany up until the year 2000.117  Under this system, an 
immigrant is excluded from “citizenship and from the community” and is only a 
temporary guest worker who will, in theory, eventually return to his or her nation of 
origin.118  This type of immigration policy has essentially been abandoned. 
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Under a policy of assimilationism, immigrants must become “culturally and 
socially absorbed, … indistinguishable from the existing population.”119  Newcomers 
may be admitted into the community provided “they adhere to the political rules and are 
willing to adopt the national culture.”120  The French are the strongest advocates of this 
policy, as to a lesser extent are the Americans.   
Multiculturalism, on the other hand, is a system where newcomers are admitted 
and allowed to “maintain cultural difference and form ethnic communities providing they 
adhere to the political rules.”121  Multiculturalism is probably the most common 
immigration policy.  It is the policy in countries like the U.K., Australia, and Sweden 
where “immigrants are not forced to conform to a dominant cultural or linguistic model 
but instead can maintain their native languages and cultural life if they choose to do 
so.”122  The idea behind multiculturalism is that “the diversity produced by immigration 
is seen as an enrichment rather than as a threat to the predominant culture.”123  
Multiculturalism gives the immigrants freedom of choice, a founding principle of 
democracy.  The expectation under this policy is that in time “most immigrants and their 
offspring will reconcile their cultural heritage with the prevailing culture, and the latter 
will be somewhat altered, and most likely richer, for that.”124  This expectation is not 
always fulfilled, however, and multiculturalism can lead to discrimination and 
disadvantage.  For instance, immigrants to Britain who choose not to learn English “can 
find themselves disadvantaged in the labour market.”  Also, evidence suggests that the 
“maintenance of some cultural norms may be a form of discriminatory social control.”125   
Proponents of assimilationism argue that enrichment of the prevailing culture and 
celebration of diversity is not necessary and the eventual reconciliation of cultures does 
not occur fast enough.  They point out that the dominant ethnic group often does not want 
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its culture threatened by potentially competing cultures.126  On the other hand, loss of 
one’s cultural heritage may lead to resentment and anger on the side of the immigrant 
community.  The current, heated headscarf debate in France is an example where 
government policy not to allow Muslim women students to wear headscarves in state 
schools has caused a furor among Muslims.   
C. THE BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITY: GENERAL STATISTICS 
According to the latest census (2001), there are nearly 60 million people in the 
United Kingdom.  Of the total, there are officially 1.6 million Muslims,127 but if 
“undocumented and asylum seeking Muslims” are added, the number may be as high as 
two million.128  Thus, Muslims make up 2.7 - 3.4 percent of the British population, or 
three percent in a round number.  Muslims comprise the second largest religious sect next 
to Christians.  The Muslim population is anything but ethnically homogeneous.  The 
largest Muslim ethnic groups are the Pakistanis (43 percent), the Bangladeshis (16 
percent), and the Indians (eight percent).  There is also a diverse mix of other British 
Muslim ethnicities including Arabs, Afghans, Iranians, Turks, Kurds, Kosovars, North 
Africans, Somalis, and Black Africans.  The majority of British Muslims were born 
abroad, but 46 percent were born in the British Isles.129  Compared to the rest of the 
population, “Muslims have the youngest age profile of all faith groups in Great 
Britain.”130  Finally, Muslims tend to be concentrated in just a few cities and they are 
further concentrated in the poorer parts of those cities.131 
D. SIX SOURCES OF ALIENATION   
There are six areas of socio-economic concern that have served to alienate some 
British Muslims from mainstream British society.  Alienation at a minimum fuels the 
strengthening of a pan-Islamic identity, to the detriment of a British identity, and at a 
maximum could possibly be a contributing factor for extremism and domestic terrorism. 
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1. Politics 
At the national level, British Muslims are dissatisfied with a perceived lack of 
protection of their religious rights and with xenophobic legislation, as well as with British 
foreign policy.  At the local level, however, Muslims are achieving significant 
representation. 
Jytte Klausen,132 as part of her study of Muslims in Europe, compared the number 
of Muslim politicians that have been elected to local and national government positions 
in six different European countries.  In Britain, she found that there are a large number of 
Muslim politicians represented in local governments, while at the national level Muslim 
representation lags.133  The reasons for this are several.  Mass Muslim migrations into 
Britain have been going on for several decades, which has allowed political 
representation to slowly evolve.  This has not been the case in other European 
countries.134  There are two other factors peculiar to Britain that boost Muslim 
participation in local government.  First, “local party committees are largely free to 
decide who gets to stand for elections,” and second, “the combination of decentralized 
local government and a high degree of residential segregation … facilitates immigrant 
representation.”135  Overall, “demography and the boundaries of municipal government 
conspire … to foster inclusion” in Britain’s local level politics.136   
Nationally, Muslims are not as well represented.  Currently there are eleven 
Muslims in the British Parliament.137  This is less than one percent of the seats for a 
group that comprises approximately three percent of the population.  Thus, the ability of 
Muslim representatives to influence national policies is minimal.   
Muslims have three major concerns about national, as opposed to local, politics.  
Results from Britain’s Home Office 2001 Citizenship Survey show that Muslims were 
the most concerned of any faith group that the government is doing “too little” to protect 
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the rights of people belonging to various religions in Britain.  While the majority of 
Muslims felt that the government was providing the “right amount” of protection, 34 
percent of Muslims felt that the government was doing too little.  For the general 
population, only 27 percent said the government was doing little.138  This is not a big 
difference, but it is notable that of all faith groups, Muslims were the most disaffected in 
this area. 
The Muslim community perceives political promises to crackdown on radical 
Muslims as xenophobia.  Many Muslims perceive legislation from the Terrorism Act of 
2000 to the Terrorism Act 2006 as an attack on their religion, rather than as legislation 
necessary to protect the community.  Klausen asked British Muslim civic and political 
leaders this question: Is “right-wing antiforeigner rhetoric not important, somewhat 
important, or very important” in explaining who is responsible for problems like 
discrimination against Muslims in Britain?  Seventy-three percent chose “very important” 
and not one person chose “not important” as an answer.139  Klausen asked these same 
leaders if they were “generally satisfied with the way Muslims are treated” in Britain.  
The majority said they were only somewhat happy.  The immediate complaints raised 
were the “perceived impact” of xenophobic anti-terrorism legislation, but also 
unhappiness “about the Iraq war.”140 
The most significant feeling of political impotence for British Muslims is their 
inability to effect changes in British foreign policy, primarily relating to Iraq, but also to 
Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, and other Muslim lands.  Gilles Kepel explained 
how political impotence can lead to terrorism.  He used the May 2003 Casablanca 
bombings in his example, but the motives uncovered thus far for both the Casablanca and 
the 7/7 terrorist attacks were similar.  Kepel said, “The Casablanca attacks resulted from 
a mix of Al Qaeda’s ideology with the social frustrations of dispossessed young men who 
decided, under the influence of radical salafist imams, to translate their political 
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impotence into terrorism.”141  Kepel and other scholars consider terrorism to be a tool 
used to influence politics when politics by other means is perceived to be a futile 
endeavor. 
Moderate Muslim leaders in the U.K. share Kepel’s point of view.  Just after the 7 
July 2005 bombings in London, Dilowar Khan,142 director of the East London Mosque, 
stated what he thought was likely to be the motivation of the 7/7 terrorists.  He believed it 
was “hopelessness,” by which he meant “opposition to the policies of powerful nations. 
… Until Iraq, the British government was also looked up to and admired in some ways. 
… Now the situation may be changing.”143  To Khan “there is considerable ill-will 
toward America among Muslims because of its policies toward the Muslim world.”  
Because Britain is America’s closest alley in the war on terror, Britain shares the ill-will.  
Chapter four addresses the implications of British foreign policy in more detail.   
In sum, dissatisfaction with protection of religious rights, perceived xenophobic 
legislation, and the inability to change British foreign policy contributed to the alienation 
of British Muslims.   
2. Unemployment and Economic Inactivity  
Muslims have higher unemployment rates and higher levels of economic 
inactivity than the rest of the British population.  National Statistics is an official 
government-run website that posts and updates British statistics on everything from 
health to the economy.144  The section on religion paints a gloomy picture of the position 
of Muslims in the British workforce.  In 2004, for both men and women, Muslims have 
the highest unemployment rate of any religious group.  The graph below shows the 
breakdown.  
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Figure 3.   Unemployment Rates by Religion and Sex, 2004145  
The large number of unemployed Muslim women will be discussed later in this section. 
An alarming fact, not depicted in figure three, is that Muslims age 16 to 24 have 
the highest unemployment rate of any group at 28 percent.  This is more than double the 
percentage of unemployed Christian men in the same age group who have just an 11 
percent unemployment rate.146  This is alarming because young Muslim men are the 
primary recruitment targets of extremist leaders like Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri 
Mohammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri.  Joblessness can lead to hopelessness, 
aimlessness, and frustration with society.  Radical Islamists claim to have the answer to 
what ails 16-24 year old British Muslim males.  Radical Islamists give young 
unemployed Muslim males something to do and a purpose in life. 
Related to unemployment is another indicator of alienation, economic inactivity.  
Economic inactivity is defined as “not available for work and/or not actively seeking 
work.”147  Here again Muslims are doing the worst of any religious group, even if the 
difference is slight when only men are considered (see figure four below).  Those who 
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believe Muslims are no worse off than the rest point out that the slight difference for 
Muslim men “is partly explained by the young age profile of Muslims and the 
correspondingly high proportion of students.”  On the other hand, comparing older 
Muslim men to men in the same age group from other religious affiliations, the Muslim 
men “tended to have the highest levels of economic inactivity, largely due to ill 
health.”148  Age differences are not depicted in the figure below, but the graphs provide a 
visual depiction of how Muslims are faring relative to other British religious groups  
 
Figure 4.   Economic Inactivity Rates, by Religion and Sex, 2004149 
Why are so many Muslims unemployed and economically inactive?  A common 
belief is that there must be religious discrimination and racism in the workplace.  There is 
some evidence that employers simply will not hire Muslims.  This question is discussed 
in section four below.  Klausen mentioned other factors in her study: 
While aggregate statistic on labor market activity is indicative of socio-
economic variations from one demographic group to another, it does not 
allow us to make solid inferences about the causes of discrimination 
because other issues, such as differences in educational attainment or 
culturally determined expectations with respect to women’s employment, 
may also explain why one group fares worse than another.150 
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So the extremely high levels of economic inactivity and unemployment of Muslim 
women may be related to the group’s expectations of its women and not necessarily to 
discrimination.  For instance, there is patriarchal enforcement of long-standing Muslim 
religious traditions where women are regarded as caretakers of the house and family as 
opposed to workers outside of the home.  Klausen mentioned other issues.  She noted 
from the 2001 British census that “young Muslim women marry significantly earlier and 
have more children and give birth earlier than other immigrant groups.”  This can 
partially explain the results displayed on the graphs above because “irrespective of faith 
and ethnicity, marriage and early childbirth work against educational and professional 
attainment among young women.”151   
As for the economic status of men, it is necessary to look at differences in 
educational attainment and job qualifications in addition to possible discrimination in the 
workplace as causative factors.  It turns out that “almost one third of Muslims of working 
age have no qualifications, the highest proportion for any faith group.”152  “No 
qualifications” means “people without any academic, vocational, or professional 
qualifications.”153  Therefore, a reasonable explanation for the high unemployment and 
economic inactivity rates may be that there are so many low-skilled, unqualified Muslims 
in Britain.   
Another factor that contributes to the poor economic showing of British Muslims 
is that many recent Muslim immigrants lack the ability to speak English. Inability to 
speak the English language in Britain creates an obvious disadvantage in the work place.  
Language barriers in addition to discrimination could help explain the unemployment and 
economic inactivity.         
 Another possibility is that the social system itself is at fault.  Clive Crook, senior 
editor of the Atlantic Monthly, explained this concept.  He said that the following factors 
lead to high unemployment rates of low-skill immigrant workers in Britain and all of 
Europe: “High mandatory minimum wages, far-reaching ‘employment-protection’ laws 
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(a misnomer, since they discourage hiring), and generous welfare systems.”154  Klausen 
pointed out another factor, i.e., an unwillingness of the British government “to recognize 
professional qualifications acquired outside of the EU.”155   
In sum, there are many factors in addition to religious discrimination and racism 
that contribute to the high unemployment and low levels of economic activity for 
Muslims in the U.K.  However, unemployment, for whatever reason, is highly likely to 
reinforce, if not create, the alienation of Muslims.  Clive Crook was correct when he said, 
“Jobs alone are not enough to ensure successful assimilation of immigrants, but jobs are a 
necessary condition.”156  The statistics on unemployment and economic inactivity do not 
explain everything, but they are consistent with another factor contributing to alienation, 
the lower standard of living in the British Muslim community.   
3. Standard of Living 
Current data shows that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who make up 59% of the 
British Muslim population, have a lower standard of living compared to other British 
ethnicities, as measured by household incomes, hourly wages, and types of jobs held.  
Further, British Muslims are less likely than other faith groups to own a home and more 
likely to live in socially rented housing and overcrowded households.  
It is not a foregone conclusion that these data mean that Muslims must be 
experiencing discrimination.  While that may be true, it is also true that Muslims are 
more likely to be unemployed and economically inactive than other faith groups.  Since 
the unemployed and economically inactive are included in the statistics on household 
income, they will pull down household income.  
Remember from the previous section that Muslim women are less likely to work 
than the women of other faith groups.  “Families with a nonworking spouse are 
comparably poorer than families with two working spouses.”157  This may also explain 
why Muslim household incomes are lower and why they are less likely to own a home.    
Klausen explained: 
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While the statistics show significant variations across racial and religious 
groups and confirm that Muslims’ socioeconomic status lags behind other 
groups, we cannot clearly distinguish between the effects of 
discriminatory variables ranging from educational gaps to behavioral 
patterns, such as the proclivity for early marriage among Muslims.158 
Clearly, there is a complex set of social and economic variables at work.  It still is 
useful, however, to consider whether community-wide low economic performance leads 
to individual alienation.   
Households headed by a Pakistani or a Bangladeshi person earn less on average 
than other Britons.  More than half of these ethnic minorities are living in low income 
households (2002-05).  Low income is defined as household income less than 60 percent 
of median income after deducting housing costs.  The chart below from the New Policy 
Institute159 (NPI) compares household incomes of various ethnicities in the U.K.: 
 
Figure 5.   Households Below 60 Percent Median Income160 
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The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)161 reported two other facts related to 
income that point to disadvantage in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim community.  
In a 2000 report, for those who are employed, “Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are ... nearly 
three times more likely to be in low pay than the white population.”162  Next, in a 2002 
report, “Pakistani and Bangladeshi men earn £150 per week less than white men.”  Men 
of other minority groups are doing better: those of Caribbean and African descent earn 
only £115 and £116 per week less than white men.163  Figure six below, again from NPI, 
reinforces these concepts and ideas as they relate to hourly wages.  The bottom line is 
that “a third of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis aged 25 to retirement earn less than £6.50 per 
hour in 2005/06,” the largest proportion of any faith group in Britain.     
 
Figure 6.   Britons Earning less than £6.50 per Hour164                                                  
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Why are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis earning less?  Wages relate to the type of 
job an individual holds.  The BBC reported that “40 per cent of Muslim men in 
employment were working in the distribution, hotel and restaurant industry, as compared 
with 17 per cent of Christian men.”165  Other researchers looked at Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis specifically and found that “one in six Pakistani men in employment were 
cab drivers or chauffeurs, compared with one in 100 White British men ... and two in five 
Bangladeshi men were either cooks or waiters, compared with one in 100 White British 
men.”  Furthermore, “Muslim men are among the least likely to be in managerial or 
professional jobs and the most likely to be in low-skilled jobs.”166   
Another indicator of standard of living is home ownership.  The Crown’s National 
Statistic Office, sourcing 2001 census data, reports that Muslims are the least likely to 
own a home (see figure seven below).     
 
Figure 7.   Home Ownership by Religion, 2001167                                                  
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There are two other issues related to housing.  Since Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have 
lower income levels, it is not surprising that Muslims are also “more likely to live in 
socially rented housing.”168  Socially rented housing is a state-sponsored welfare 
program for families with special financial and/or social needs.  Specifically, 28 percent 
of Muslims live in social rented housing compared to 20 percent of the general 
population.169  Second, Muslims are the “most likely faith group to experience 
[overcrowded] housing conditions.”170  Thirty-two percent of Muslims live in an 
overcrowded abode, compared to only six percent of Christian families.171    
Why are Muslims, and especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, earning 
less and experiencing the housing concerns just addressed?  Racism, religious 
discrimination, and Islamophobia are far from the whole story.  When young Muslims 
see and read about the poor state of affairs of their fellow Muslims, they are further 
alienated from the Anglo-Christian establishment.  The data presented here can reinforce 
the sense of social injustice held by young Muslims.  Zachary Shore, Professor of 
National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, concluded that what the 
“overwhelming majority of Europe’s Muslims” want is to further a Muslim 
“interpretation of greater social justice—mainly for workers, women, migrants, and the 
poor.”172   
4. Religious Discrimination, Racism, and Islamophobia  
In the previous section, several reasons were discussed why Muslims are 
underemployed, unemployed, or being paid less than the average Briton.  In contrast, a 
study by the BBC pointed to racism, ethnic stereotyping, or Islamophobia as reasons for 
the job disparities.  In the study, resumes from six different fictitious applicants were sent 
to 50 private firms.  The only differences between the resumes were the names that were 
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used on the applications.  The names used were male and female names that are typically 
considered white, Muslim, and black names.  The white applicants were named Jenny 
Hughes and John Andrews: the Muslim names were Fatima Khan and Nasser Hanif; and  
the black names were Abu Olasemi and Yinka Olatunde.  The question to be answered 
was which applicants would be asked to come in for a job interview.  White applicants 
were contacted for interviews almost 25 percent of the time; blacks, 13 percent of the 
time; and Muslims only nine percent of the time.173  Religious discrimination or racism 
seemed to be the primary explanation for the actions taken by the hiring departments of 
these 50 firms.         
Perceptions matter just as much as factual evidence.  The perceptions Muslims 
have is that they are being harassed, discriminated against, and face an increasingly 
Islamophobic Britain, especially since 9/11.  For instance, “One survey by a UK-based 
Islamic human rights group found that 80% of Muslims polled felt harassed or 
discriminated against in 2004, compared to 35% in 1999.”174  In 2004 survey by the 
Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR)175, the findings are similar: “Since 11 
September 2001, 80 per cent of Muslim respondents reported being subjected to 
Islamophobia; … 68 per cent felt they had been perceived and treated differently; and … 
32 per cent reported being subjected to discrimination at UK airports.”176  The FAIR 
survey was designed to gauge only Muslim perceptions since 9/11.  Unfortunately, a 
comparison to the perceptions of other minorities or faith groups post-9/11 cannot be 
made.    
A 2001 report from Britain’s Home Office clearly indicated that Muslims feel 
discriminated against.  The findings of the report were based on 156 meetings, 
interviews, and discussion with 318 individuals.  In addition, questionnaires were mailed 
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to 1,830 “religious organisations throughout England,” of which “628 questionnaires 
were returned.”177  Highlights of the findings follow. 
“Hostility and violence were very real concerns for organisations representing 
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus.”  To Muslims, discrimination is becoming more prevalent: 
“The majority of Muslim respondents thought that hostility, verbal abuse and unfair 
media coverage had become more frequent.”178   According to the researchers, the main 
victims of religious discrimination were Muslims.  
A consistently higher level of unfair treatment was reported by Muslim 
organisations than by most other religious groups, both in terms of the 
proportion of respondents indicating that some unfair treatment was 
experienced, and by the proportion indicating that these experiences were 
frequent rather than occasional.  The majority of Muslim organisations 
reported that their members experienced unfair treatment in every aspect 
of education, employment, housing, law and order, and in all the local 
government services covered in the questionnaire.179 
Is the problem racism or religious discrimination?  The answer is that they are two 
sides of the same coin.  When a Pakistani is called the disparaging term “Paki,” the 
motivation could be religious hatred, racial hatred, or both.  The Home Office report 
agreed: “Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus reported the most discrimination overall and 
research participants who belonged to these minority groups often identified a degree of 
overlap between religious and racial discrimination.”180 
Surveys and interviews from the Home Office study led researchers to conclude 
that education is an area of life where significant discrimination is perceived to exist by 
respondents. 181  Fear of their children being maltreated because of their religion is a 
major concern for Muslim parents.  They “cite racism and a lack of recognition and 
support for their children’s faith identities as problems in British community schools.”182  
Because of this, many Muslims would like to send their children to Muslim schools.  In 
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Britain there are 7,000 Christian schools that are state-funded, but only five state-funded 
Muslim schools.  The perception the Muslim community has of its government would 
improve of course if the government would fund more Muslim schools, but politicians 
must be responsive to their constituent majority and “polls show that almost two-thirds of 
the general public is opposed to the Blair government’s plan to increase the number of 
faith schools.”183      
The findings discussed above parallel the conclusions reached by Klausen in her 
study of European Muslims.  Klausen conducted detailed interviews with over 300 
Muslims from six different European countries, one of which was Britain.  Three hundred 
is a reasonable sample size because she estimated there are only 1,500-2,000 individuals 
in the six countries who meet her criteria of being “an elected or appointed leader in a 
national or regional civic or political organization, who is of Muslim faith or 
background.”184  The number of British civic or political leaders interviewed varied from 
topic to topic from approximately 25 to 50 individuals.  As community leaders and 
politicians, their opinions were important because they should, in theory, have a good feel 
for the perceptions of the Muslims in the communities that they represent.  The Muslims 
interviewed by Klausen were people whose job it was to represent the community as a 
whole. 
Klausen’s findings on discrimination are summed up succinctly.  She writes, “In 
Britain, … the overwhelming perception was that Muslims suffered particular forms of 
discrimination.”185  She supported this claim by asking the participants in her study what 
would be their “first choice of public policy for ethnic and religious minorities” in 
Britain.  The question had five choices plus open-ended choice where the respondents 
could say something other than what she had listed.  29 of the 31, or 93.5 percent, of the 
civic/political leaders picked, “unified antidiscrimination law including religion” as their 
first choice.  After providing other evidence she concluded that “discrimination and bias 
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are seen as the critical obstacles not just to the free exercise of Islam, but also to the 
ability of Muslims to integrate and advance in society.”186   
In sum, Muslims perceive racism and discrimination in the schools, in the 
workplace, and other parts of British society.  They believe that Muslims have a lower 
standard of living, higher unemployment, and greater economic inactivity because of 
racism, Islamophobia, or religious discrimination.  If their perception is correct, then the 
government needs to improve laws to protect minorities against these forms of 
discrimination.  If the perception is wrong, then the government needs to work with the 
Muslim community to change those perceptions.  In either case, if the government does 
nothing, it can expect greater alienation of young Muslims.   
5. Education 
Before discussing the British educational system, it is necessary to mention that 
the British government gathers data on education by ethnicity alone and not by religious 
category.  Therefore, most conclusions on Muslims and education are based on the 
statistics on Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.187   
The media tends to say the outlook with respect to education for Muslims is 
anything but positive.  For instance, the Hindustan Times reports, “Muslims are already 
segregated by lack of education and no opportunities for upward social mobility.”  Also, 
“if education is the key to opportunity and mobility, they [Pakistanis] are certainly behind 
most people.”188   
The MCB reports statistics consistent with the headlines.  For example, “In 2000, 
30% of Pakistani students gained five or more good GCSEs, compared with 50% in the 
population as a whole.”189  GCSEs, or General Certificates of Secondary Education, are 
standardized courses taken by students age 14-16 throughout the U.K. except Scotland.  
At the end of a two-year study, students are given a grade from “A” to “G” with A (or 
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actually A*, which is the same as A+ in America) being the best.  A “good” GCSE score 
is in the A*- C range and “bad” GCSE score is in the range D - G.190  The MCB reports 
that from 1998 to 2000 there have been “impressive gains” in all minority groups’ GCSE 
scores, except for Bangladeshi pupils, whose scores have actually fallen.  Furthermore, 
Pakistani children have had a “below average rise in performance.”191    
The chart below shows 2004 GCSE scores compared by ethnic group.  Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi boys are second from the bottom in performance.  Only black boys had 
worse GCSE scores.   
 
Figure 8.   Pupils Achieving Five or more Grades A*-C at GCSE, 2004192  
As noted in the section on unemployment above, Muslims have the highest 
proportion (almost 33 percent) of working age men and women with no job 
qualifications.  The findings summarized in the chart below supports this claim.  
                                                 
190 Directgov, “Education and Learning,” 2006,  
http://www.direct.gov.uk/EducationAndLearning/QualificationsExplained/QualificationsExplainedArticles/
fs/en?CONTENT_ID=10039024&chk=oxLA2U (accessed December 2006).  Directgov is the “Official 
United Kingdom government portal and guide to information on central and local services, living in the 
UK, business resources, public documents, and more.” 
191 Muslim Council of Britain, “Muslim Statistics,” December 2006, 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/library/statistics.php#6 (accessed December 2006).  For that particular statistic the 
MCB references, “The National Literacy Trust.” 
192 Office for National Statistics, “Education: Chinese Pupils have Best GCSE Results,” 21 February 
2006, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=461 (accessed December 2006).   
55 
 
Figure 9.   People of Working Age with No Qualifications: by Religion, 2004193 
Two reasons for the lack of qualifications are: (1) Muslims immigrated to the 
country without qualifications or education and (2) Muslims are less likely to benefit 
from the British education system.  Poor GCSE scores mean Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and 
black male students are leaving secondary school less well educated than the rest of 
British children.   
As for the degree of education of immigrants, U.K. National Statistics reports that 
“Muslims and Sikhs who were born in the U.K. are more likely than those born 
elsewhere to have a degree or equivalent qualification, irrespective of age.  Among those 
under the age of 30, U.K.-born Sikhs and Muslims were almost twice as likely to have 
degrees in 2004 as those born elsewhere.”194  Since only 46% of Muslims were born in 
Britain, the British educational system is clearly not the sole reason for the high number 
of unqualified British Muslims; immigrants are arriving to the U.K. without skills.   
It remains true that Muslim parents “cite racism and a lack of recognition and 
support for their children’s faith identities as problems in British community schools.”195  
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Thus, in spite of the data that discrimination at school is not the reason for Muslims’ poor 
GCSE scores and lack of qualifications, if a perception of racism persists, then alienation 
will continue.     
6. The Police, the Courts, and Anti-terrorism Legislation 
There is considerable evidence that Muslims feel they are being unfairly targeted 
by the police and the courts under recent anti-terrorism.  The perception of discrimination 
has led to increased alienation in the Muslim community and increased radicalism may 
follow.  Evidence of the effects of the laws and their enforcement comes from the reports 
by various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), comments from both Muslim and 
non-Muslim community leaders, and from statistical data. 
The National Council for Civil Liberties, known simply as Liberty, is a 
nongovernmental agency that “works to promote human right and protect civil liberties” 
throughout the United Kingdom.196  In a 2004 report, Liberty, assessed the “impact of 
anti-terrorism measures on British Muslims,” and concluded as follows: 
Police powers have been used disproportionately against the Muslim 
population in the UK.  The majority of arrests have been Muslims. … The 
way in which anti-terror powers are being used, has led to feelings of 
isolation amongst many of the 1.6 million Muslims in the UK.  There is 
disillusionment with a Government which, rather than protecting them 
from this backlash, is effectively criminalizing them as a community.  The 
group as a whole is stigmatized, and Muslims have often described 
themselves as felling ‘under siege.’ … The relationship between British 
Muslims and the authorities is at an all time low. ... The way in which 
Muslims are being treated by the authorities … is making them reluctant 
to come forward and assists.  In addition, the mood of resentment which 
has developed can foster and encourage extremism amongst a small 
number of an increasingly marginalized group.197 
Some of the anti-terror powers Liberty refers to include “police stop and search 
powers” and “incarceration without trial” for those detainees deemed a threat to society 
because of their alleged links to or tendencies towards terrorism.  In both of these areas, 
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the Muslim perception is that “British Muslims [are] being unfairly policed” and that the 
justice system is biased against them.198  
Human Rights Watch (HRW), another nongovernmental organization, essentially 
agrees with Liberty.  HRW’s mission is to protect “the human rights of people around the 
world.”  In their 2004 report, HRW “has also found that the enforcement of the 
legislation ‘has harmed race and community relations’ and undermined the willingness of 
Muslims in the United Kingdom to cooperate with police and security services.”199 
Specific comments by two community leaders reinforce the NGO findings.  
Khurshid Ahmed, of the Commission of Racial Equality, in an interview with the BBC in 
2004 said,  
There is tremendous disquiet within the community. … It has given 
license to racist and religious bigots employed within the security services 
to unleash a form of terror on innocent people up and down the country. 
… The community has the responsibility to co-operate with security 
agencies to ensure our own safety, but the way to get that co-operation is 
not by terrorising the people and by allowing, without accountability, 
some within agencies to peddle their race hate among the communities.200 
Even leaders of the Church of England are speaking out.  Regarding anti-
terrorism measures, in September 2004, Tom Butler, Bishop of Southwark said, “In 
recent years stop and search powers have been employed disproportionately against 
Muslims. ... Confrontational methods of policing are likely to prove counter-productive, 
as they risk increasing radicalisation of young Muslims in particular.”  The net result 
Butler says is "that Muslim communities experience counter-terrorist policy as 
discriminatory and threatening is a serious cause for concern."  He maintains that new 
anti-terrorism “contributes powerfully to a sense of double standards of justice, liberty 
and dignity between British citizens and others, most of whom are Muslims.”201 
Because Muslims feel they are targets of the police, it is not surprising that their 
perception of injustice in British society extends to the courts.  “A survey in 1999 by the 
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Lord Chancellor’s Department of all court users showed that … white people (80%) were 
the most satisfied with the court, higher than black people (75%) and Asians (Indian 
77%, Pakistani 73% and Bangladeshi 66%).”  Again, Pakistanis and Bangladeshi’s are 
the least satisfied group.  The Lord Chancellor’s Department cautions the reader not to 
draw sweeping conclusions with the Bangladeshi data because their sample size was 
small.202   
Have Muslims been targets of the police?  The statistics seem to bear out the 
perception that they have been.  Although Muslims make up three percent of the general 
British population, in 1999 Muslims made up seven percent of the prison populations203 
and in 2001 Muslims were eight percent of the inmates.204  Looking at police statistics on 
stop and search incidents, Muslims appear to be over-represented.  Between 2000/01 and 
2001/02 stop and searches on Asians rose by 41 percent, searches on blacks rose 30 
percent, and searches on whites rose only 8 percent.  From 2002-03 the number of Asians 
stopped and searched rose by over 300 percent.  “Even the Police have expressed 
concerns about this rise.”205   
In sum, in the early years of the twenty-first century, anti-terrorism legislation 
enforced by the police and the courts has increased feelings of isolation, disillusionment, 
and resentment in the Muslim community, which can lead to alienation and encourage 
extremism.    
E. CONCLUSION 
British Muslims experience high unemployment, high levels of economic 
inactivity, low income levels, and poor housing conditions, all of which contribute to the 
problem of alienation.  They also have poor GCSE scores and fewer work skills.  British 
Muslims perceive racism, religious discrimination, and Islamophobia in the schools, in 
the workplace, and in society in general.  These conditions and perceptions discourage 
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many young Muslims from wanting to integrate into British society.  Terrorist attacks in 
Britain pushed legislators to close gaps in anti-terrorism laws.  The goal was to protect 
British citizens from more attacks; but as an unintended consequence, the anti-terrorism 
laws are further alienating a Muslim community that already has many reasons not to feel 
welcome in Britain. 
Unless changes are made to reduce the alienation of the British Muslim 
community and foster a cultural pluralism that accepts Muslims as Britons, more young 
Muslims will reject the possibility of a dual identity that includes being British in favor of 
a strictly Islamic identity open to extremist ideas.  In the globalized society of today, even 
if Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri Mohammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri are locked up or 
have fled the country, the alienated can be led down the path of extremism via the 
internet, by trips abroad, or in a plethora of other creative ways.  The solution to Britain’s 
dilemma is not merely to solve the problems identified earlier, but to remedy the 
alienation at its source.  Chapter five investigates potential policy changes that may 
lessen the six socio-economic sources of alienation and ease the threat of further Islamic 
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IV. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 
A. THE ARGUMENT 
British foreign policy causes a large minority of British Muslims to deemphasize 
or, at worst, reject their British identity in favor of a pan-Islamist one.  Particularly 
troublesome is British policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, 
and other Muslim lands.  For a minority of the British Muslim population, this foreign 
policy creates an us-versus-them mentality where they choose their Islamic identity and 
reject their British identity.  Even in cases where some admit that a dual identity is 
possible, their Muslim identity is stronger.  This is true because British policy choices 
directly impact the global Muslim community, known as the ummah.     
B. THE COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Just days after the 7 July 2005 London bombings, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
vehemently denied any possibility that the attacks were the result of British foreign 
policy in the Middle East, especially in Iraq.  On 11 July, when Blair was asked if 
“Britain and the United States were all terrorist targets because of their support for the 
war in Iraq, Blair responded that the attacks were ‘aimed at our way of life, not at any 
particular government or any particular policy’."206  Other members of Parliament 
backed Blair, including antiwar critic Tony Wright who said “it was ‘dangerous 
nonsense’ to even suggest that the attacks were in any way connected to Britain's 
participation in the war.”207  The evidentiary support for these claims is that there were 
terrorist attacks against the West long before the Iraq war.  The 11 September 2001 
attacks in the U.S. happened before both the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan.  Of 
course there is more than just 9/11.  In another July 2005 interview, Blair pointed out that 
“Russia had suffered terrorism with the Beslan school massacre despite its opposition to 
the war, and terrorists were planning further attacks on Spain even after the pro-war 
government was voted out [after the Madrid bombings].”208   
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Over a year later the Prime Minister’s tune had not changed.  In a 17 October 
2006 interview, Blair still “rejected claims that [the presence of British troops in Iraq] 
fueled Muslim extremism at home and abroad.”  He went on to add that “it was ‘absurd’ 
to say that the military action in Iraq or Afghanistan fueled extremism in Britain.”209 
The same argument is shared by Blair’s closest allies like Prime Minister John 
Howard of Australia and President Bush.  Howard, in a joint interview with Tony Blair 
on 21 July 2005, maintained that Western policy in Iraq is not the reason for the terrorism 
perpetrated in London.  Howard said, “Can I remind you that the murder of 88 
Australians in Bali took place before the operation in Iraq.”210 
In September 2006, President Bush agreed with Blair and Howard.  In a series of 
interviews that focused on the leak to the media of the National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) titled, “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” Bush 
claimed policy in Iraq does not increase international terrorism.  He maintained that 
“critics who believe the Iraq war has worsened terrorism are naive and mistaken, noting 
that al-Qaida and other groups have found inspiration to attack for more than a 
decade.”211  Furthermore, he believed “it is naive and a mistake to think that the war with 
Iraq has worsened terrorism.”212  His assessment of terrorist motivations dismisses the 
idea that Iraq is the problem.  The President said, “My judgment is, if we weren't in Iraq, 
they'd find some other excuse, because they have ambitions.”213 
Some terrorist analysts agree with these world leaders that Iraq is not the problem.  
To Reuel Marc Gerecht, the Iraq war is not the cause for the “ever-expanding waves of 
holy warriors” hell-bent to destroy Britain and the United States.  Gerecht is a resident 
fellow at the American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research and the former 
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Middle East specialist at the Central Intelligence Agency.  He says that anyone who 
thinks that Iraq is somehow more important than everything else the West has done 
wrong in the Middle East is gravely mistaken.  From “the Danish cartoons lampooning 
the Prophet Muhammad … [and] European support for Muslim dictatorships” to 
sanctions imposed upon Iraq throughout the 1990s and Western culture infiltrating 
Muslim lands via globalization, it just cannot be that Iraq is somehow more important 
than everything else as the raison d'être for terrorist attacks like the 2005 London 
bombings.214   
C. WHY THE COUNTERARGUMENTS ARE WRONG 
Blair, Howard, Bush, and Gerecht are wrong.  Support for this argument comes 
from four sources.  First, from the terrorists themselves—7/7 terrorists Mohammad 
Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer left behind martyrdom videos.  Their words 
explicitly describe their motivations.  Second, three top spokesmen for the Muslim 
community explained what they believe is causing Islamic extremism in the U.K.  They 
are Kamal Helbawy, who helped create both the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and 
the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB); Sir Iqbal Sacranie, former Secretary General 
of the MCB; and Inayat Bunglawala, assistant secretary-general of the MCB.  These men 
have their fingers on the pulse of a large portion of the British Muslim community and 
can legitimately characterize the effect of British foreign policy on Muslim’s opinion of 
the government.  They also have described what they believe are the leading causes for 
homegrown Islamic extremists targeting civilians in the U.S., the U.K., and Israel.  Third, 
British polls on Muslim opinions related to British foreign policy run counter to Blair’s 
assertions.   
As a final source, the opinions of both governmental and civilian researchers 
about the cause-effect relationship between British foreign policy and terrorism shed light 
on the subject.  Key findings are disclosed in a “restricted,” Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office and Home Office dossier titled, “Young Muslims and Extremism.”  This restricted 
report was not intended for public consumption, but was leaked to the media in 2005.  
This British report meshes well with the American NIE report mentioned above and is 
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worthy of review.  Further, in Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Chicago, in his book, Dying to Win, develops a theory on the motivations 
for suicide terrorism.  Since suicide attacks are a now familiar tactic used by British 
Islamist terrorists, Pape’s findings are worth evaluating.   
1. What the Terrorists Said  
What did 7/7 bombers Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer say prior 
to their suicide attacks in London?  The eldest and presumed leader of the group of four, 
Mohammad Khan, recorded a video explaining why he was going to attack his country:   
… I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. 
Our drive and motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that 
this world has to offer.  Our religion is Islam, obedience to the one true 
God Allah and following the footsteps of the final prophet messenger. … 
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world.  And your support of them 
makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.  Until we feel 
security you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight.  We are 
at war and I am a soldier.  Now you too will taste the reality of this 
situation.  I myself, … [pray] to Allah … to raise me amongst those whom 
I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes 
like our beloved Sheikh Osama bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahri and Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in 
the ... (garbled) ... of this cause.215 
Clearly, although Khan was a citizen of the United Kingdom, he did not identify 
with the British community.  His communal ties were to his “brothers and sisters” in the 
Muslim world.  His nationalist loyalties were to the pan-Islamic nation.  He saw world 
events not through a British lens, but through a Muslim lens.  Of course, there are 
individual differences in the motivations of the four bombers, but due to the close social 
ties and close interaction between the four men in the months leading up to the events, 
the general perception is that the group shared the views of their leader, Khan.216   
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The video shows that Khan was upset about occupation of the Middle East by the 
West.  Other clues to his motivation are contained in a written will and testament that he 
left behind.  Although British authorities have not released that document, the Home 
Office in their official report on the London bombings pointed out that Khan’s written 
will “draws heavily” on the last will and testament of Suraqah al-Andalusi, a role model 
of Kahn’s who was killed in Afghanistan in 2001.217  Excerpts from Andalusi’s last will 
and testament logically point to the motivations of Kahn:   
If we look around us at the reality of the Muslims we see a regretful state 
of total humiliation, with very few instances of dignity for the Muslims. 
The Muslims have generally, as an Ummah, abandoned the teachings of 
this Deen and Allah (SWT) has left us at the mercy of the forces of 
disbelief from the Crusaders, the cowardly Jews, arrogant atheists and evil 
apostates.  Nothing embodies this more than the state of affairs in 
Palestine today.  Allah (SWT) has placed this small nation of cowardly 
Jews over the necks of the Muslims. … And finally I warn the Muslim 
brothers and sisters to expel the Jews and Christians, atheists and their 
puppet apostates from our three occupied Holy sites.  The Jews have taken 
Masjid Al-Aqsa from the Muslims and the impure Americans and their 
accomplices from the traitorous Ale Saud (Saudi Royal Family) walk the 
Holy Land. … So it us upon us to liberate our Holy sites from the terrorist, 
occupying American forces and to purify Masjid Al-Aqsa from the filth of 
the Jews.218 
Obviously, occupation by a foreign power is at the heart of the argument as to why 
Andalusi, and by association, Khan, believed he must fight the West.   
Shehzad Tanweer’s martyrdom video aired on al-Jazeera television very close to 
the one year anniversary of the July 2005 bombings.  Tanweer’s video points out much 
more directly than Khan’s that British foreign policy in the Middle East was the reason 
for his suicide mission.  Tanweer said, 
To the non-Muslims of Britain, you may wonder what you have done to 
deserve this. You are those who have voted in your government, who in 
turn have, and still continue to this day, continue to oppress our mothers, 
children, brothers and sisters, from the east to the west, in Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported 
the genocide of over 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah. … You have 
offered financial and military support to the U.S. and Israel, in the 
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massacre of our children in Palestine. You are directly responsible for the 
problems in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq to this day. You have openly 
declared war on Islam, and are the forerunners in the crusade against the 
Muslims. … What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a 
series of attacks, which, inshallah, will intensify and continue, until you 
pull all your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, until you stop all financial 
and military support to the U.S. and Israel, and until you release all 
Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh, and your other concentration camps. 
And know that if you fail to comply with this, then know that this war will 
never stop, and that we are ready to give our lives, one hundred times 
over, for the cause of Islam. You will never experience peace, until our 
children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers 
in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace.219 
Presumably the video was assembled by al-Qaeda because recorded video messages by 
al-Qaeda leaders Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn220 were intermixed with the 
video made by Tanweer.  There are no indications that either Khan or Tanweer were 
coerced into making these videos.  Their expressions in the videos and the passion in 
their words demonstrate that what they say is genuinely what they believed.  In the 
Tanweer video the comments by al-Qaeda members Zawahiri and Gadahn reinforce the 
words of Tanweer—a top reason for their jihad against the West is retribution for the 
atrocities committed against Muslims in Muslim lands by the U.S., the U.K., and their 
allies.     
If you take the words of the two suicide bombers and the two top al-Qaeda 
figureheads at face value, and there is no reason not to, Prime Minister Blair is naïve to 
think British foreign policy is not fueling Muslim extremism.  The only other possibility 
is that Blair—for guarded political reasons or perhaps to protect his foreign policy 
agenda—publicly denies the fact that Iraq war is fueling extremism, while privately he 
realizes the opposite is true.      
2. What Spokesmen for the British Muslim Community Say 
According to some radicals, British foreign policy in the Middle East is a main 
source of the contempt held for the British government and for British citizens.  British 
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citizens are also to blame, according to the radical Islamists, because they voted for the 
politicians who are making the foreign policy choices.  Is this a point of concern only for 
the radicals or is British foreign policy also a concern for a larger group of British 
Muslims?  Could foreign policy be a driving factor pushing moderate British Muslims 
into radicalism?   
Kamal Helbawy, Iqbal Sacranie, and Inayat Bunglawala are community leaders in 
the “moderate” Muslim community.  Their viewpoints on the subject of foreign policy 
are particularly enlightening.   
In August 2005, Mahan Abedin, a terrorism analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, 
interviewed Helbawy.221  The purpose of the interview was to consider “how to deal with 
Britain’s Muslim extremists.”  When asked about Islamic radicalism in the U.K., 
Helbawy explained that radicalism is a big problem and the reason for its upsurge in 
recent years is that “many young Muslims feel alienated by events overseas and by 
injustices here in the U.K.”  By referring to events overseas, he agreed with London 
Mayor Ken Livingstone that “the events in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine” are possible 
motivating factors for the 7/7 bombers.  It should be noted that this interview was 
conducted prior to the airing of the martyrdom videos discussed above.  Specifically, 
Helbawy said, “If the U.K. had not taken part in the invasion of Iraq and had a more 
balanced policy toward the issue of Palestine, it is entirely possible that the bombings 
would not have occurred.”  He says that there are likely more radicals out there “who are 
willing to do this [suicide terrorism] to correct what they see as injustices against 
Muslims both here at home and abroad.”222  In sum, Helbawy believes that the 
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government has failed to convince many Muslims that the global war on terror is not a 
war against Islam.   
The Muslim Council of Britain’s perspective is similar.  Just prior to the 2003 
Iraq war, Iqbal Sacranie, then Secretary General of the MCB, authored an open letter to 
Tony Blair asking the Prime Minster to take “the lead to avert a war against Iraq.”  
Sacranie predicted that an invasion of Iraq would cause lasting damage to U.S. and U.K. 
relations with the Muslim world.  He praised the government’s “commendable attempt to 
reactivate the Middle East peace process” in recent years, but warned that “a war on Iraq 
would certainly unravel whatever little has been achieved so far.  The humiliation and 
bitterness that would attend a military conquest is likely to provide a natural ground for 
the growth of bitterness and conflict for generations to come.”  He said that the British 
Muslim community was still suffering “from the backlash of the September 11th 
atrocities” and predicted that community relations and interfaith relations would 
“deteriorate even further” if Iraq were invaded.   He went on to say that British foreign 
policy was hypocritical and undermined relations with the pan-Muslim community.  The 
government appeared to “implement UN resolutions to our own [British] interpretations.”  
Resolutions aimed at helping the people of Palestine and Kashmir were “ignored”, but 
when it came to Iraq, Britain was “swift to obtain and implement UN resolutions.”223     
Sacranie’s argument is supported by more recent statements by Inayat 
Bunglawala, assistant secretary-general of the MCB.  He said that Tony Blair was blind 
to the truth when he denied “the Iraq factor” as fuel for extremism in the U.K.  
Bunglawala emphasized that he was not apologizing for terrorism or giving terrorists an 
excuse for what they have done, but did believe the government “needs to acknowledge 
that extremist groups have taken advantage of Britain’s role in the wars against 
Afghanistan and Iraq and Washington’s longstanding blind support for Israel,” if the 
government wishes to understand what issues are serving as recruiting tools for extremist 
organizations.  Most recently, Blair government estranged many in the British Muslim 
community when the government refused “to support calls for an immediate ceasefire in 
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the [2006] Israel-Lebanon conflict.”  In doing this, “Tony Blair appeared to be giving a 
nod and a wink to the Israelis that they had more time to accomplish their military goals.”  
To back up these claims, Bunglawala cites poll after poll which have “shown that large 
majorities in the Muslim world believe that British and American foreign policy is hostile 
towards them and that the West regards the spilling of Muslim blood as being of little 
importance.”224  A review of the polling data will follow in the next section of this 
chapter.   
 In summary, from Kamal Helbawy to Iqbal Sacranie to Inayat Bunglawala, these 
prominent spokesmen for the Muslim community stated that British foreign policy is a 
critical factor leading to Islamist extremism at home and abroad.  They were careful to 
point out that their claims should not be taken as making excuses for the terrorists, but 
they simply maintain that if one wants to understand the root causes for extremism, one 
must realize how important pan-Muslim perceptions of Britain’s foreign policy are.       
3. What the Muslim Public Says 
This section examines the results of an October 2006 poll that specifically looked 
at British Muslims’ opinions about British foreign policy and its effects.  The poll was 
conducted by the 1990 Trust.  The 1990 Trust is a “human rights and anti-racist charity 
dealing with issues affecting African, Caribbean and Asian communities.”  The aim of 
the survey was first “to look at how Muslims felt, in particular, about foreign policy, its 
direction, and the issues surrounding it.”  As a second objective, the 1990 Trust pursued 
this project because it “felt that previous polls and the sensational manner in which some 
of them were reported have left many serious questions unanswered.”225 
Data was collected via an on-line survey.  The intent was to poll only Muslims.  
In an effort to do so, the survey “was posted on various Muslim websites: Muslim 
Directory, Muslim Public Affairs Committee (UK), Q News, and the Islamic Human 
Rights Commission.  The survey was also sent out to the networks of the following 
organizations: Muslim Council of Britain, Muslim Association of Britain, British Muslim 
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Initiative, Khoja Shia Ithnaasheri, and Newham Public Affairs Committee.”226  The total 
number of respondents was 1,213.227    
Overall, the findings from the survey support the assertions of the Muslim 
spokesmen discussed above.  For instance, 91 percent of the respondents believe “the 
‘War on Terror’ has increased the threat of terrorism in the West.”  Researchers 
compared this to the same question put to the general public (all faith groups) in an 
August 2006 ICM Poll.  In that poll, 72 percent believed “that the UK was now more of a 
target of terrorist due to its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”  But it is not just Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  78 percent of Muslims in the 1990 Trust poll see “the current situation in 
Palestine a cause for radicalization in the UK.”  Respondents in this poll were also 
permitted to include personal comments in the survey.  Some of those comments were 
documented in the report.  An unnamed respondent in the 1990 Trust poll reinforces 
Sacranie’s argument that the foreign policy of the U.S. and Britain was hypocritical:  
“Palestine and the treatment of the Palestinian people represents the maximum in 
Western hypocrisy, bias, injustice and support of corruption and racial discrimination.”228 
In addition, 89 percent “feel included in the global concept of the Muslim 
ummah.”  Because of this feeling, there is concern over recent events in Lebanon: “nearly 
63% of respondents felt the recent occurrences in Lebanon were caused by a combination 
of Israel, the USA and UK.”  Researchers pointed out that this again shows that Muslims 
are alienated by British foreign policy.  Surprising and totally opposite to claims made by 
Bush and Blair, in only a very few British Muslim minds was Hezbollah to blame for the 
conflict (2.6 percent).229      
Concern for the people of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Lebanon relates to the 
strong pan-Islamic identity mentioned throughout this thesis.  When asked, “Do you feel 
included in the global concept of the Muslim ‘Ummah’?”  89 percent said yes.  Of those 
who said yes, 91 percent said “their feelings towards the treatment of the Muslims in 
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other parts of the world are affected by this bond.”  Surprisingly, many Muslims do not 
see a conflict with having multiple identities such as being a Muslim and being a British 
citizen.  “92.7% of respondents feel that this loyalty towards ‘Ummah’ does not 
contradict one’s role as a citizen of a nation, able to live and work within one’s society.”   
Rhetoric from Bush and Blair does not seem to be convincing Muslims in the 
U.K. that the war on terror is not a war on Islam.  “Over 81% of Muslims questioned 
believed the war on terror is a war on Islam with only 10% disagreeing.”  Perhaps 
because of this perception, “79.4% think that there has been an increased threat of 
terrorism in the UK since 9/11.”  When asked, “what do you think is the main reason for 
the increased threat” of terrorism since 9/11, the majority (61.2%) said, “disagreement 
with Britain’s foreign policy” was the cause.”230    
Concerning the current debate in the U.S. on whether American troops should 
stay or withdraw from Iraq, 73.6% of British Muslims “think that if American and British 
troops were to leave Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat of terrorism in the UK would 
decrease.”  One respondent had an enlightening comment as he predicted the effect of 
troop withdrawal: “I think the UK [has] too much blood on their hands and as such even 
if we withdraw I am not sure if the threat would completely go away.”231    
This is not to say that British Muslims generally condone the actions of a select 
few radical violent British Islamists.  When asked if it is “justifiable to commit acts of 
terrorism against civilians in the UK,” 96 percent “of respondents said it was 
unjustifiable” and two percent felt that terrorism against civilians was justifiable.232  This 
result is positive in that an overwhelming majority rejects “violence by Muslims;” 
however, two percent of 1,213 respondents is 24 individuals.  Is it a problem that there 
are 24 people out there who can justify acts of terrorism against civilians?  Some would 
definitely argue yes, because it only took four to perpetrate the July 2005 bombings.          
There is quite a difference between who the government calls a terrorist and who 
the majority of British Muslims in this survey call terrorists.  In the eyes of a majority of 
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British Muslims, their government has missed the mark in that “92.5% of respondents 
feel that Israel is a terrorist state” and “93% of those polled feel that Bush and Blair are 
sponsors of state terrorism.”  The good news is that British Muslims do seem to separate 
politicians from their constituents as “only 13% of Muslims polled believe that British 
Christians should apologise for the actions of Blair in Iraq and Afghanistan.”233   
While this is only one poll, data presented in the next section—from other polls 
gauging the same issues—support the overall findings of the 1990 Trust.     
4. What the Experts Say 
This section discusses the results of three current studies of terrorism.  The first to 
be considered is a joint Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
dossier entitled “Young Muslims and Extremism.”  This report was classified “restricted” 
by the British government and was not intended for public consumption.  The report was 
originally published in early 2004 and was leaked to the press right after the 7/7 
bombings.  The full report is now available on-line.   
Second is a U.S. government report leaked to the press on the same subject.  In 
September 2006, the New York Times published leaked classified information from a 
National Intelligence Estimate report entitled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications 
for the United States.”  Following the leak, President Bush ordered portions of the report 
declassified for public review.  What was released was not as detailed as the British 
report.  It consisted of a mere four pages of text, but it is still useful in that it 
complements the British findings.   
Finally, Robert Pape, author of Dying to Win, conducted extensive research on 
suicide terrorism.  His findings on the relationship between foreign occupation and 
suicide terrorism are solid and insightful.     
The problem the authors sought to solve in the leaked British report was “how to 
prevent British Muslims, especially young Muslims, from becoming attracted to 
extremist movements and terrorist activity?”234  The authors recognized that generalizing 
findings with a “simple cause and effect” formula was impossible.  They do, however, try 
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to summarize with caveats.  Their answers are organized in three categories: anger, 
alienation, and activism.  The anger is generated by “a perception of ‘double standards’ in 
British foreign policy, where democracy is preached but oppression of the ‘Ummah’ … is 
practiced or tolerated e.g. in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya; a 
consequent sense of helplessness over the situation of Muslims generally; [and] the lack 
of any real opportunities to vent frustration.”235 
As causes for alienation, they list difficulties in reconciling an Islamic identity 
with a British identity; lack of participation in civil society and politics; societal 
Islamophobia; and a belief that governmental counter-terrorism efforts target their 
community.  As causes of activism, they see that young Muslims are looking for an 
Islamic identity different than that of their parents or the mainstream Muslim 
organizations who are seen as having “sold-out.”  In their search the youth lack a 
foundational knowledge of Islam, which leaves them vulnerable to radical interpretations.  
The youth have a need to belong, and want answers to the problems they face today, but 
often they find the parental or mainstream interpretations of Islam inadequate.236   
In the FCO report, the foreign policy concerns of Muslims, and especially young 
Muslims, are grouped into five areas.  First, is the perceived double standard mentioned 
above—the perception of hypocritical policy choices made by primarily the U.S. and 
U.K., but also other Western governments and even some Muslim governments.  Second, 
there are “perceived Western biases in Israel’s favour in the Israel/Palestinian conflict.”  
Third, these perceptions “have become more acute post 9/11.”  The perception is that 
British oppression of Muslims everywhere has changed from passive oppression to active 
oppression.  Passive oppression is exemplified by “non-action on Kashmir and 
Chechnya,” and active oppression is demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan today.  
Fourth, all this “disillusionment” with British policy makers is compounded with a “sense 
of helplessness,” whereby, the disillusioned youth “lack any tangible ‘pressure valves’ … 
to vent frustrations, anger or dissent.”  Fifth, because of disillusionment and helplessness, 
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and because of their identification with the ummah, young Muslims yearn for an Islamic 
solution.237 
On the positive side, “the great majority of British Muslims [67 – 85 percent] 
regarded terrorist attacks on western targets, including the 9/11 attacks, unjustified.”  
Furthermore, 75-87 percent “felt loyal to Britain,” 67 percent “felt patriotic,” and 62 
percent “thought it wrong for British Muslims to fight against allies in Afghanistan.”  
However, there are significant negative findings.  Up to 13 percent “defend terrorism” 
and as many as 26 percent “did not feel loyal to Britain.”  Furthermore, 35-70 percent 
“thought the war on terrorism was a war on Islam.”  Disapproval of Afghanistan versus 
Iraq was significant as 64-80 percent of those polled disapproved of the Afghan war and 
a solid 80 percent disapproved of the Iraq war.238   
In summary, the report found that “many Muslims are unhappy and angry about 
aspects of … foreign policy, because they perceive it as biased against or unfair towards 
Muslims in the world.”239  In terms of what factor might contribute most to inflaming 
Muslim extremism, foreign policy “is often the area of government policy which 
generates the most anger and sense of injustice among Muslims generally, but 
particularly amongst the younger generation.”240   
American findings are comparable to the British findings since these are the two 
Western nations most often accused of carrying out injustice against the global ummah.  
The declassified American report consists of only the “key judgments” of the NIE report 
and not the full report.  The key judgments with regards to the Iraq war are close to the 
conclusions drawn by the FCO and Home Office.  For instance, “the Iraq conflict has 
become the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement 
in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.”  It is 
important to note that in the eyes of the NIE, a policy of “cut and run” from Iraq is not 
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the solution.  If American troops abandon Iraq, this will embolden the jihadists241 
because in their minds they will have once again beaten a superpower.  “Once again” 
because jihadists believe that the righteousness of their Islamic struggle was what led to 
the defeat of the Soviets in the 1980s Afghanistan war.     
Iraq, however, is not the sole reason for the spread of jihad—it is actually one of 
four reasons according to the NIE: 
(1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of 
Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of 
powerlessness; (2) the Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained 
economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; 
and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims—all of which 
jihadists exploit.242 
Before closing the NIE discussion, mention of a conclusion reached by the NIE is 
particularly important for Britain.  “The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for 
attacking Western interest.  Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in 
Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks.”243  Even though America has 
its share of Muslim diasporas, for reasons unexplained in this report, Europeans are more 
at risk than the Americans.           
Pape’s book Dying to Win presents the views of a private, non-governmental 
observer.  Pape argues that four key factors dramatically increase the likelihood of 
suicide terrorism being used as a tactic to influence government policy.  He suggests that 
if a government can counter the four key factors, it can dramatically decrease the 
probability of suicide terrorism being perpetrated against its citizens.  Pape’s theory on 
suicide terrorism can be summarized as follows: 
National resistance to foreign occupation, a democratic political system in 
the occupying power, and a religious difference between the occupied and 
occupying societies are the main causal factors leading to the rise of 
suicide terrorist campaigns. … Modern suicide terrorism is best 
understood as a strategy used by groups seeking to compel democratic 
states to withdraw military forces from territory that they consider their 
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national homelands. … A difference in the predominant religion of the 
two societies … is a main cause for why some foreign occupations by a 
democratic state escalate to suicide terrorism and others do not.244 
Pape uses evidence from across the universe of nationalist rebellions since 1980 
and from an examination of al-Qaeda.  The operative words in his theory are:  
nationalism, occupation, against democracies, and religious difference.  By nationalism 
Pape does not necessarily mean identifying with a particular nation-state.  Nationalism in 
his definition also means appealing to a national identity such as pan-Arab or pan-
Muslim.245  By occupation Pape means not only traditional occupation in the sense of 
troops on the ground, but also political occupation, i.e., “the exertion of political control 
over territory by an outside group.”246  Suicide terrorism is not about ideological 
differences, or a clash of civilizations, it is really a form of protest against foreign 
occupation.247 
Democracies are targeted by suicide terrorists more often than other forms of 
governments such as autocracies for several reasons.  First, democracies are less 
repressive of terrorists because they protect democratic principles like freedom, liberty, 
and justice.  Because of freedom and liberty, terrorists find it easier to plan attacks in 
democracies.  Further, media coverage of their message is easier to obtain.  In a 
democracy, the public, the audience of the terrorist attacks, is more powerful in 
influencing the government for change than it would be in a dictatorship.  Whether the 
beliefs held by the terrorists are based in reality is not the point.  Rather, these ideas are 
what terrorists believe about different forms of government and terrorism.248   
There can be suicide terrorism without religious differences, but overall, “the risk 
of suicide terrorism is higher when a foreign occupation by a democratic state also 
involves a religious difference.”249  “There are powerful prohibitions against suicide in 
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virtually every society,” even in a Muslim society.250  But dying for one’s faith, 
martyrdom, changes the prohibition.  The community “temporarily suspend[s] the 
prohibition against voluntary death” if those who die are dying for the sake of the 
religious community.251   
It is clear that the 7/7 bombers and a significant minority of other marginalized 
Muslims identify less with the British community and more with the global ummah.  
Their nationalist tie is to pan-Islam, not to Britain.  Viewing the world through this lens, 
occupation by a foreign power is a key concern in places like Iraq where non-Iraqi, non-
Arab, but most importantly non-Muslim soldiers occupy the state.  Since Britain is a 
democratic state and predominantly Christian, all four parts of Pape’s theory are 
encompassed in the British scene.   
In summary, according to Pape, the “root cause of suicide terrorism does not lie in 
an ideology” (like Islamism, for example).252  Instead, the root cause of suicide terrorism 
is actually foreign occupation.  The situation in Iraq is critical:  “… The longer that 
American forces remain in Iraq, the greater the threat of the next September 11 from 
groups who have not targeted us before.”253  The author says “us” meaning the United 
States, but his statement applies to the United Kingdom as well, because of its 
involvement in Iraq.  “So long as foreign combat troops remain in the Arabian Peninsula” 
Britain will be at risk of experiencing another 7/7, another transatlantic airline terror plot, 
and other acts of terrorism.254  Potential policy changes and solutions are offered in 
chapter five.   
D. CONCLUSION 
There are many reasons to believe that foreign policy choices made by the British 
government are fueling Muslim anger and heightening Islamic extremism in the U.K.  
From this standpoint, it is difficult to understand why Prime Minister Blair at least 
publicly refuses to acknowledge that fact.  Lies and hypocrisy can only serve to alienate 
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more Muslims.  While few believe that the U.K. and the U.S. can simply pull out of 
Afghanistan and Iraq tomorrow, many believe there is much the U.K. government can do 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the Middle East and South Asia to dissipate the 
anger the Muslim community feels.  Both short-term and long-term solutions are 




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The increase of pan-Islamism in Britain that has sometimes led to violent 
extremism is caused by a combination of factors: social alienation in the Muslim 
community, the rise of domestic Islamism fueled by radical religious leaders, and most 
significantly, dissatisfaction with British foreign policy in Muslim lands.  The 
combination of factors is depicted in the figure below.   
 
Figure 10.   Pan-Islamism in Britain: Causal Factors 
 
1. Domestic Islamism 
British laws and traditions allowed men like Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri 
Mohammad, and Abu Hamza al-Masri to do and say things that contributed to the 
radicalization of the 7/7 bombers, the 7/21 bombers, the shoe bomber, the 20th hijacker, 
and others.  Two areas of the law were problematic: laws relating to asylum, 
immigration, and deportation; and laws protecting freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, and other civil liberties.  To make matters worse, British authorities knew what 
many radicals were doing, but chose to look the other way for political, strategic, and 
other reasons.   
In the area of asylum, immigration, and deportation, the U.K. struggled to find a 
balance between opening its doors to individuals who were persecuted by foreign 
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governments and closing its doors to those with radical ideas.  Years ago, Britain simply 
opened its doors to everyone.  At the same time, a shortage of religious leaders in the 
Muslim community led to hurried processing of visas to allow imams to immigrate 
before the government understood the consequences of these actions.  Finally, in order to 
comply with human rights treaties, British officials found it difficult to deport radicals, 
even after they had committed crimes in Britain or abroad. 
In an open and free society there is always a difficult balancing act between 
freedom and protection.  Most nations find that there must be some limits on free speech 
and religion.  The British government was slow to adapt counterterrorism laws aimed at a 
domestic, Irish-Catholic terrorist threat, to the rising internationally-inspired Islamic 
jihadist threat.    
British authorities tolerated groups and individuals who may have been involved 
in terrorist activities for two primary reasons.  Some evidence suggests that the 
government was not concerned about Islamist British residents who were only a threat to 
parties outside of Britain.  Because police and intelligence resources were limited, 
radicals were allowed to go virtually unchecked so long as they were not threatening 
British citizens.  Second, even if British authorities were concerned about the domestic 
Islamists, there are reasons they did not take action.  In some cases their hands were tied 
by British laws that lacked provisions for prosecuting someone who promoted terrorist 
activities abroad.  In other instances, the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend” applied, as in the case of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and Britain’s 
troubled relationship with Qaddafi. 
Moderate British Islamists lost out to the radicals in the campaign for the 
allegiance of some young British Muslims either because their message was less 
appealing or the youth saw the moderates as sell-outs to British policy makers.  In some 
cases intimidation of the moderates by the radicals may have caused the moderates to 
withdraw.     
Although British authorities eventually put al-Faisal and Abu Hamza in jail, and 
chased Bakri Mohammad out of the country, these men were not an isolated group. They 
were only part of a larger problem.  Closing the legal loopholes and tightening the 
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security noose could only do so much to solve the problem of domestic Islamism.  While 
those three notorious men may be gone, there are other jihadist leaders ready to take their 
places.  There are some 100,000 British Muslims who could be categorized as adherents 
of Islamic fundamentalism.  Of these, an estimated 3,000 could be considered a danger to 
the public.  Laws that crack down on the leaders of the domestic Islamists will not change 
the views of 100,000 sympathizers.  To counter the threat that is domestic Islamism, 
officials have to identify and alleviate the sources of alienation that push young Muslim 
men towards radical Islamism.   
2. Sources of Alienation 
The six sources of social injustice identified in chapter three are the prevailing 
issues that are pushing young Muslims away from mainstream British society and 
towards radical Islamism.  They are: lack of influence in national politics; unemployment 
and economic inactivity; a lower standard of living; the perception of religious 
discrimination, racism, and Islamophobia; educational concerns; and the police, the 
courts, and anti-terrorism legislation.  These are problems of utmost importance. It is 
their alienation that leaves young Muslim men receptive to the radical Islamist leaders.  
Even with men like al-Faisal in jail, it is likely that other radicals have simply taken their 
propaganda campaign underground in response to the state’s repression of their message. 
Even if all the domestic radical leaders were somehow silenced, alienated British 
Muslims could still be mobilized by a radical al-Qaeda inspired global jihadi ideology 
from abroad.  A domestic void could be filled by travel to meet radicals abroad or 
proselytizers using the world wide web.  Alienated young men can become self-taught 
jihadists by means of the globalized media such as international satellite television 
programs, videos, books, audio tapes, and the internet.  In an open society like the U.K., 
the government cannot simply shut off access to radical ideological thought and 
discussion.  Therefore, the sources of the alienation must be addressed.    
3. British Foreign Policy  
British foreign policy is not just another source of alienation.  It is the greatest 
source of alienation.  Despite Prime Minister Blair’s public denial that foreign policy is 
leading to an increase in terrorism at home and abroad, there is overwhelming evidence 
from a multitude of sources that he is wrong.   
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The war in Iraq is just the tip of the iceberg.  At the base is the perception of one-
sided support for Israel, to the detriment of the Palestinians, and this lopsided support has 
been going on for decades.  There are also Muslim concerns that British policy led to the 
decimation of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  But it was when 
British troops actually occupied Muslim lands in Afghanistan and then Iraq, that a 
significant number of British Muslims reached their breaking point.     
The death and destruction caused by the wars in these lands are critical 
components of an effective advertising campaign developed by the jihadists.  The stories 
and images of atrocities committed by a coalition of American and British troops—the 
murder of thousands of innocents including women and children—supported the radicals’ 
argument well and sent a message that resonated with many British Muslims.  Radicals 
tell their new recruits that it is their duty before God to defend the global Muslim 
community.  Terrorism, including suicide bombings, is an effective way to wage war 
against a physically and technologically superior enemy.  Martyrdom brings glory in the 
afterlife for those who believe.  The critical component that leads to a dramatic rise in 
suicide bombings is the occupation of a peoples’ land by a foreign force.255  The question 
now is how to fix the problems. 
B. MOVING AHEAD: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS  
1. Domestic Islamism 
Muslim extremists were able to exploit Britain’s liberal laws and values and this 
put the public at risk.  Changes were needed.  When updating the laws to protect the 
public, the government must make certain they do not sacrifice liberty in the name of 
enhanced security.  Furthermore, the government must ensure that their efforts do not 
further alienate the Muslim community. 
The first and easiest lesson for the British government to learn was that toleration 
of radical Islamist activities had to stop.  This required a pragmatic shift in government 
thinking at all levels.  The government was forced to recognize that radical Islamism is 
not only a concern of some far away country, but also a threat to Britons at home.  A shift 
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in mindset was only the first step.  The second step was that British laws needed to 
change in order to fight the threat.   
The government closed loopholes in the laws that allowed radical Islamist leaders 
to encourage terrorism, to disseminate terrorist publications, to incite terrorist acts, etc.  
This step was the correct response to stop activities that were not intended to be protected 
under freedom of speech and freedom of religion.  Freedom of speech is not a blanket 
guarantee to say anything.  It was obvious that what the extremists were saying was 
designed to harm non-Muslims and to encourage illegal activities.   
But law makers made mistakes.  The biggest mistake they made was with Part 4 
of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.  Amnesty international summed up 
the most common objection to this portion of the new law.    
Under the ATCSA, non-UK nationals, whose removal or deportation from 
the UK cannot be effected, can be certified as ‘suspected international 
terrorists’ by the Secretary of State and immediately detained without 
charge or trial—that is, interned—for an unspecified and potentially 
unlimited period of time, principally on the basis of secret evidence.256  
Those accused of crimes related to terrorism under Part 4 are deprived of due process 
including the right to a fair trail, the right of presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty, and the right to legal council.  Their freedom is taken away from them “without 
charge or trail.”257 
While the intent of the law was to protect the public, there were unintended 
consequences.  Policy makers say freedom, justice, and liberty are core values that must 
be upheld always; yet under ATCSA, legislators enabled the police and courts to 
incarcerate terrorist suspects without revealing any of their evidence.  Jessica 
Wolfendale, a full-time Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public 
Ethics, University of Melbourne, Australia, maintains that counterterrorism actions like 
these do more harm than good.  She says,  
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…Terrorism does not pose a threat [to the well being of citizens] sufficient 
to justify the kinds of counterterrorism legislation currently being enacted.  
Furthermore, many of the current counterterrorism practices pose a greater 
threat to individual physical security and well-being than non-state 
terrorism.  We should fear counterterrorism more than we fear 
terrorism.”258   
Since all of the eleven individuals detained under this law (as of November 2004) were 
“devout Muslims,”259 the perception was that the government had criminalized an entire 
community based on their faith.  A violation of justice in the name of security and 
protection does more harm than good.  Fortunately, the government quickly recognized 
its untenable stance and repealed Part 4 of the ATCSA. 
To avoid further legislative pitfalls a study group of high level Muslim civic and 
political leaders recommended the following:  
The Government must encourage and empower greater Muslim 
participation in the various reviews of anti-terrorism provisions and 
implement the recommendations of these reviews in a more transparent 
manner.  The Government must consult widely, and particularly the 
Muslim community, on any further anti-terrorism provisions. The UK 
must lead on and not unilaterally derogate from international principles 
and standards of human rights.260    
Clearly, the way ahead in the war on terror is to enact legislation that strengthens the 
police and intelligence agencies, while avoiding laws that assault the very democratic 
values Britons treasure.  Anti-terrorism legislation that seems to unfairly target Muslims 
actually bolsters support for the radicals’ message.   
Michael Freeman, Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, among others, says the “Goldilocks approach” is needed.  Police action must not 
be too tough and not too soft.  Instead, the solution must be “just right.”  Consider the 
story of Northern Ireland.  With hindsight, most agree that the crackdown in Northern 
Ireland, 25 years ago, was a one-sided attack on the Irish Catholics by the British police.  
                                                 
258 Jessica Wolfendale, “Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism,” Studies of Conflict 
and Terrorism 29 (2006): 753.   
259 Amnesty International, “Briefing for the Committee against Torture” (briefing presented to the 
Committee against Torture, November 2004), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=38BA3EEE9D70807880256F4D0047ABE2 (accessed 
December 2006).   
260 Home Office, Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups, October 2005, 7, 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1502010 (accessed December 2006).   
85 
Repression did not halt violence, but instead radicalized more North Irish Catholics, who 
became hell-bent on countering the British violence with Irish violence inflicted by the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA).   
Regarding reform of immigration, asylum, and deportation laws, the government 
has accomplished much to fix the problems in those areas as well.  Immigration 
procedures have been tightened up.  More resources have been dedicated to enforcing the 
laws.  Procedures have been streamlined to filter legitimate asylum seekers from potential 
terrorist on the run.  The title of “Londonistan” is fading as Britain has increased 
engagement and bilateral agreements for the extradition of criminals wanted in foreign 
countries, while still complying with the protocols of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.   
More specifically, procedures have changed on how imams from abroad acquire 
British visas: “A new requirement is that they demonstrate a command of the English 
language and an understanding of British society as a condition of renewing a visa.”261  
This is a first step in resolving the problem of foreign imams who are out of touch and 
unable to communicate with Muslim young people.  Efforts are also being made to 
bolster the number of homegrown imams.  More and more programs in Islamic studies 
and Islamic chaplaincy are being offered at British colleges and universities which 
supplement imam training at British Islamic seminaries.262  Domestically trained clerics 
are better suited to understand the peculiarities of practicing Islam in a Western and 
predominately Christian society. 
Again, care must be taken to ensure changes in laws, procedures, and proceedings 
are not misconstrued as a one-sided attack on the Muslim minority.  British policy 
makers should not make policy changes in a vacuum.  They should engage and consult 
Muslim community leaders prior to making changes, to avoid community backlash.  If 
the war against terror is perceived as a war against Islam, the jihadists effectively win.  
The British government is making efforts to prevent this perception.   
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After the terrorist events in July 2005, the British government called together a 
working group of many Muslim civic leaders and politicians.  The group met for six 
weeks in August and addressed many of the concerns identified in this paper.  On the 
subject of imams in Britain, an 18 person team led by Lord Nazir Ahmed (politician and 
serving member of the House Lords), 263 recommended the following:   
A new national advisory body/council of mosques and imams. This Body 
would be inclusive and representative of the many traditions practiced in 
the UK, independent and lead by the institutions it serves.   
The setting up of a National Resource Unit (NRU) for the development of 
curricula in madrasah/mosques and Islamic centres. The NRU will also 
develop programmes and guidelines for the teaching of staff that function 
within these institutions. The programmes and guidelines will be 
developed with respect and in compliance with the diversity and schools 
of thought in the Muslim Community overall. 
The establishment of a continuous professional development programmes 
for the ‘upskilling’ of current imams and mosque officials in the UK. 
Theological training to be provided only by specialist Muslim seminaries, 
Islamic scholars skilled in training imams in the UK and elsewhere for 
those seeking to pursue further development. 
Design a publication that highlights and promotes good practice from 
amongst mosques, Islamic centres and imams in the UK.264 
The British government is on the right track if it continues to consult the Muslim 
community and incorporate its recommendations into public policy.  When they do, they 
empower the moderates, who hopefully can lead the youth through the pitfalls of finding 
themselves as Muslims in a non-Muslim country.  Changes in the laws take radicals off 
the streets who are willing to physically intimidate the moderates—as was the case in the 
story of the Stockwell mosque.  Accordingly, changes in the laws should make it more 
difficult for the advertising campaign of radical jihadists to reach their target audience—
alienated Muslim youth.  New laws make participation in radical activity less appealing 
because the costs of activism have gone up—amplified criminal consequences serve as a 
deterrent.  However, the better solution to the headache that is domestic radical 
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extremism is not aspirin in the form of new anti-terrorism laws.  The more effective 
response is to stop the alienation.   
2. Sources of Alienation 
The first source of alienation to consider is the national political system.  
Regarding the perception that the government is doing too little to protect the rights of 
people of religion, the solution seems obvious.  The government needs to extend the 
provisions of equal opportunity and racial equality laws “to cover discrimination on the 
grounds of faith.”265  For example, the primary anti-discrimination law is the Race 
Relations Amendment Act 2000.  This piece of legislation is incomplete in that it only 
protects an individual from discrimination based on race, color, nationality (including 
citizenship), or ethnic or national origin.  Nowhere in the law is religion addressed.266  
Other faith groups have not objected to the gap in this law because their faith is part of 
their ethnicity, as is the case with the Jews and the Sikhs for example.  A Jewish man or 
woman could challenge discrimination in the workplace by claiming discrimination 
against their ethnicity.  The second problem of with this law is that it only offers 
protection from discrimination in the public sphere and not in the private sector.  This 
idea is supported by the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, Brendan 
Barger.  Commenting on the BBC study which showed that resumes with Muslim names 
were the least likely to receive and offer for an interview (detailed in chapter three), he 
Barger said, "Until the Race Relations Amendment Act is extended to the private sector, 
[minorities] will continue to be treated unfairly and will be denied the opportunity to 
succeed at work."267  Equal opportunity and racial equality laws must be updated.   
To address the xenophobia in politics, the discussion in the previous section 
applies.  The government should engage the Muslim community when searching for 
solutions.     
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When high unemployment and economic inactivity are considered as sources of 
alienation and injustice, there are four areas to study.  First, the government must protect 
Muslims from discrimination in the workplace so they can compete fairly with all faith 
groups for the job opportunities that exist.  Second, if unemployment is a result of the 
large number of unskilled Muslim workers, then perhaps the government needs to re-
examine the educational system.  Third, for those Muslims immigrating to Britain 
unskilled, programs to train and educate adult immigrants could help.  Fourth, for those 
immigrating without the ability to speak English, government funding for English classes 
is money well spent to counter alienation.  The expansion of programs like the Learning 
Skills Council’s adult basic skills initiative and programs with the Basic Skills Agency 
Resource Center could address the latter two problems.268  The low standard of living of 
Muslims is of course related to the high level of unemployment.  Helping the Muslim 
workforce would naturally increase their standard of living.   
Another potential area for governmental policy initiatives would be programs to 
inform and educate the female Muslim population.  The government must ensure that 
Muslim women are offered the same opportunities as the rest of British citizens.  A study 
group composed of leading Muslim women was asked by the government to look at 
issues concerning Muslim women in Britain.  The group recommended increasing 
dialogue and communication between government and Muslim women.  This dialogue 
should advertise and promote the opportunities available and “means of access for 
women to enter the workplace.”  The community and the government should build a 
Muslim Women’s “national campaign and coalition” whose goal is to “increase the 
visibility of Muslim women and empowering them to become informed and active 
citizens within society.”  By championing Muslim women who are currently successful 
outside of the home, this would help to dispel the misperception that “higher levels of 
civic society are irrelevant, elusive or beyond the reach of Muslim women.”269 
As far as the educational system as a source of alienation, there is racism—or at 
least the parents’ perception of racism—in the schools; and the fact that Muslim children 
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are scoring poorly on their GCSEs.  Solutions to these problems in the educational sphere 
are beyond the scope of this paper, except to say that what the government must strive to 
do is to ensure a level playing field and create an equal opportunity for all children 
regardless of faith or ethnicity.   
One particular problem worth addressing is the low number of government- 
funded Muslim faith schools.  There are 7,000 Christian faith schools and only five 
Muslim schools.  A good faith effort by the government would be to increase funding for 
Muslim schools.  Xenophobic legislators say that increasing Muslim schools will foster 
further isolation and worsen problems of integration.  They believe that Muslim schools 
will foster extremism by mirroring Muslim madrasas from abroad.  Their logic is flawed.  
What is most important is equality in application of the laws and equal access to 
government funds for all faiths and ethnicities.  Catering to one group and restricting 
another is simply unfair and only serves to alienate.  In addition, these government 
funded religious schools are not private.  Their curriculum follows government approved 
guidelines so they cannot import and teach some radical program of study from Pakistan 
or Saudi Arabia.  Therefore, xenophobic fears in this area are more likely to be 
unfounded.   
The remaining two sources of alienation are religious discrimination, racism, and 
Islamophobia; and the police the courts, and anti-terrorism legislation.  For the most part, 
solutions to those problems were discussed above.  However, an expanded discussion on 
the police is worthwhile.   
Law enforcement officials could improve their standing in the Muslim community 
if they would heed the recommendations made by the participants of the April 2006 Anti-
Terrorism Laws seminar, held at the University of Birmingham.  This group of civic 
leaders from both U.K. Irish Catholic and Muslim communities, concluded that today the 
police are out of touch with the Muslim community and are not trusted.  The police are 
seen as outsiders.  In order for the community to have confidence in the police, the police 
must proactively engage, partner with, and otherwise increase their involvement and 
interaction with the Muslim community.  An increase in police transparency would 
90 
change the current attitude that the police are targeting the whole community, instead of 
just the criminals.  If these actions are taken, then a sense of justice could be restored. 270 
The social justice that Muslims want is to be offered the same opportunities as the 
rest of the British population.  The government must reduce the perception of injustice if 
it wants to reduce alienation.  There are three general recommendations for addressing 
the causes of alienation: 1) an expansion of anti-discrimination legislation to protect 
religion; 2) an effort to show the Muslim community that the police, the courts, and the 
law makers are there to fight crime and not to attack the entire Muslim community; and 
3) the guarantee of equal opportunities for Muslims in the schools, in the workplace, and 
in British society as a whole.   
3. British Foreign Policy  
British foreign policy is the key contributing factor to Islamic radicalism in 
Britain.  While it is the most obvious source of alienation, it is, at least in the near term, 
the most difficult problem to fix.  While an entire thesis could be dedicated to the study 
of British foreign policy in Muslim lands, in short, there are three recommendations.  
First, in the near-term, Britain must bolster its counter-ideology and counter-advertising 
campaign against the jihadists.  Second, in the long-term, British troops must leave 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Third, a solution must be found to the Israel/Palestine conflict.   
So long as troops must remain in Muslim lands, the British government needs a 
counter-advertising campaign that will rival the jihadists’ propaganda machine.  When 
the jihadists claim that British forces are killing women and children, the British must 
publicize their version of the story.  In addition, the British must report stories of justice 
and progress.  The media is simply too sensationalistic and focused only on the bad news 
in its reporting on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  A more concerted effort is 
needed to highlight the positive and progress.   
The problem with this short-term strategy is that the message may be ignored 
because of the messenger.  Matthew Nilson, U.S. Army Special Forces officer who 
earned a Master of Arts degree in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, 
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points out in his paper “Countering Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology,” that in order “to 
win the war of ideas,” two things must occur.   
First, a counter-indoctrination system must be developed, which is similar 
in structure and method as that used by Islamic fundamentalist. This 
counter-structure includes the development or co-option of a series of uni-
versities, mosques, and madrassas that preach the counter-ideology. … 
Without a counter-structure the effectiveness of message dissemination 
and internalization will be greatly hindered.  
Second, the context of the counter-ideology must be Islamic in nature. 
Radically replacing an Islamic methodology with a Christian dogma will 
isolate the population and strengthen the bonds between Muslims and the 
Islamic fundamentalists thereby reinforcing religious crusade rhetoric.271 
A withdrawal of British troops from Iraq and Afghanistan should not occur until 
stability is ensured.  Without stability, Afghanistan and Iraq will likely deteriorate into 
vehemently anti-West states similar to the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan or something 
worse.  Troops cannot leave until stability of the state can be provided by an indigenous 
government allied with the West.  Leaving before stabilization would be disastrous 
because it would embolden the jihadists as happened when the Soviet military withdrew 
from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.  Every effort must be made to give Iraq and 
Afghanistan back to their citizens with a stable government, chosen by the people.  The 
government in power cannot be seen as a puppet government of the West.   
Ending the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan is such a high priority because as 
long as British troops are on the ground and in battle against Muslims, alienation will 
continue.  Pape takes it one step further, estimating that suicide terrorism, like the 7/7 
London bombings, will also continue.  He claims that the root cause of suicide terrorism 
is foreign occupation.272  He believes that “spreading democracy across the Persian Gulf” 
will not solve the problem of suicide terrorism against the West “so long as foreign 
combat troops remain in the Arabian Peninsula.”273  The situation in Iraq is critical:  “… 
The longer that American forces remain in Iraq, the greater the threat of the next 
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September 11 from groups who have not targeted us before.”274  The author’s argument 
is directed at the U.S., but his statement applies to the U.K. as well, since the U.K. is also 
deeply involved in Iraq.  Once Iraq is stabilized, if Western forces must remain in the 
Middle East because of the West’s Achilles heal, the need for access to foreign oil, Pape 
believes it is important that foreign troops are not stationed in Muslim lands.  He 
recommends that in order “to preserve access to Persian Gulf oil, … crucial to the 
world’s economy,”275 the American and the British should “off-shore balance” versus 
stationing troops on the ground.  By off-shore balancing he means a withdraw of “all 
American combat forces from the region … while working with [Middle East states 
friendly to the U.S. like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain] to ensure that they maintain 
the critical infrastructure for a  rapid return of U.S. forces should that prove necessary” to 
protect Persian Gulf oil.276  Off-shore balancing sends “an unmistakable signal that the 
United States [and Britain are] not in the business of empire, and will thus suck the 
oxygen out of the atmosphere that breeds anti-American suicide terrorism.”277  
Unfortunately, off-shore balancing is a not a realistic solution in the near-term, because 
the United Kingdom cannot exit Iraq until stability in the national government is assured.   
The third pressing concern in the area of British foreign policy is the urgent need 
to end one-sided support of Israel to the detriment of the Palestinians.  One-sided support 
in any disagreement usually alienates the other side and its supporters, in this case the 
global ummah.  U.N. resolutions need to be supported evenly and the British must ensure 
that both sides in the conflict comply with international law.  Ultimately, there must be a 
long-term solution acceptable to both the Palestinians and the Israelis.  After Iraq and 
Afghanistan, this is the next most important concern if Britain wants to solve the problem 
of Muslim alienation and the rise of pan-Islamism in Britain.     
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